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“ANYTHING AND EVERYTHING”:
THE PROBLEMATIC LIFE
OF CONVIVENCIA
Abigail Hartman

In early 2015, poet and novelist Steven Nightingale published his first piece of nonfiction. Granada: A Pomegranate
in the Hand of God is in some ways the author’s love-letter to
the city in southern Spain, an expression of appreciation for the
rich culture and complex past of a place that “has had an
uncanny influence in the history of Europe and the world. It is
a hive of stories, of sweetness, and of secrets. We might call it
a pomegranate in the hand of God.” 1 The pomegranate stands
in the book as a symbol of the multicultural, multireligious
society of al-Andalus—a society which, in its peaceful heyday
when “the three principal religious communities of the Mediterranean settled down to live together,” produced a wealth of
literature, architecture, and art.2
Nightingale’s goal is to bring these achievements to light,
a pursuit he likens to “the excavation of buried treasure” that
over the years has been “lost under layers of confusion,
ideology, propaganda, ignorance, religious animosity, indifference, and hot debate.”3 Expressing frustration with academics
who would complicate, minimize, or even dismiss this cultural

1

Steven Nightingale, Granada: A Pomegranate in the Hand of
God (Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint Press, 2015), 8.
2 Ibid., 120-121.
3
Ibid., 198.
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zenith, 4 and desiring “to let the work of the period speak for
itself,” 5 he embarks on an experiential, sensual exploration of
al-Andalus’ artistic triumphs: its enduring Islamic architecture;
the musical tradition of flamenco; the poetry and philosophy of
such men as Samuel ibn Neghrela, a Jew who served as a
general and vizier under Muslim rule, and Ramon Llull, a
Franciscan who also translated Muslim writings and studied
Jewish mysticism. All of these wonders, he argues, were made
possible only by the pluralism of Spain’s medieval days, by the
coexistence, known as convivencia, of Christianity, Judaism,
and Islam. Though not himself a historian, his perspective on
the convivencia is worth quoting at length, as it embodies one
extreme in the debate that has been ongoing since the term was
introduced to historiography in the mid-20th century:
The convivencia was a dangerous experiment. It proceeded by fits and starts, setbacks and abominations,
strange alliances, unexpected advances, and practical
ingenuities. Its achievements, only recently come into
focus, were without precedent in Europe. It is a schoolroom where we might learn, we who even now are failing disastrously to live together at a time with much
more dangerous weapons and billions of lives at stake.
And we might start by learning from its fate, when in
the fifteenth century al-Andalus, with all its accumulated knowledge and accomplishments, met King Ferdinand and Queen Isabel. The two monarchs brought to
the Iberian peninsula a will to power, a formidable
union, a sense of messianic duty, and, in 1480, their own

4

Such dismissal, he implies, can only be explained as the result
of sheer bigotry and unwillingness to accept the influence of nonChristian cultures in the making of Spain; see ibid., 246.
5
Ibid., 129.
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specially designed government agency: the Holy Inquisition. 6
Indeed, Nightingale’s take on medieval Spain represents
everything that inspires Maya Soifer in her 2009 article
“Beyond Convivencia” to reject the word altogether. In her
view convivencia is “loaded with a cacophony of problematic
associations,” 7 including a portrait of medieval Spain as a
uniquely harmonious society in contrast with a backwards,
intolerant Europe. Indeed, she believes the term has been so
debated and manipulated over time that it can only have
associations, not substance: “Convivencia can be anything and
everything,” and, at the same time, nothing. “Why use a term
weighted down by ideological contentiousness and corrupted
by generalizations and unprovable assumptions?” she asks
rhetorically. 8
Soifer’s article is part of a recent historiographical backlash against the term first coined, or at least popularized, by
Américo Castro in 1948. 9 Convivencia itself appears at first

6 Ibid., 188.

In an endnote Nightingale admits the contentiousness of the term and the continuing debate over how exactly this
“living together” worked in daily practice, but adds that “for this
writer, these debates are a tiresome and troublesome waste of life,
a kind of conceptual tar pit” (p. 354, n. 188). The really interesting question, in his mind, is what was achieved artistically in the
period. Presumably, then, he would also have little or no interest
in a historiographical paper like this.
7 Maya Soifer, “Beyond Convivencia: Critical Reflections on
the Historiography of Interfaith Relations in Christian Spain,”
Journal of Medieval Iberian Studies 1, no. 1 (2009): 31.
8
Ibid., 21.
9
Castro is generally seen as the father of convivencia; Alex
Novikoff, however, observes that Castro borrowed the term from
the philologist Ramón Menéndez Pidal. See Alex Novikoff,
“Between Tolerance and Intolerance in Medieval Spain: An
Historiographic Enigma,” Medieval Encounters 11, no. 1 (2005):
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glance a deceptively simple word, translating roughly to “living
together” and referring to the period of Spanish history—from
the Muslim invasion of 711 to the expulsion of the Jews and
Muslims in 1492—when those who professed Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam inhabited the Iberian Peninsula. That
simplicity, however, belies the complexity of the issue, and
historians since Castro have used convivencia in a variety of
ways to describe what that “living together” looked like and
what its impact has been on Spanish identity. Castro envisioned the term as (in Soifer’s words) “an idealist construct that
aspired to describe the mental processes taking place in the
collective consciousness of the three cultures.”10 Subsequent
historians, such as Thomas F. Glick, have reformulated it as a
social construct, a means of describing the grand structure and
evolutionary process of cultural change; others, like David
Nirenberg, have applied it at the level of microhistory in an
effort to explain the dynamics of interfaith relations “on the
ground.” Still others, in the vein of Steven Nightingale, employ
it as a concise descriptor of a near-utopian society that the
modern world has been struggling ever since to regain. Indeed,
the very flexibility and “limitless susceptibility to manipulation
and reinvention” that Soifer decries 11 has contributed in large
measure to the enduring appeal of the term; for it captures,
without actually describing or explaining, the intriguing
realities of cultural contact in medieval Spain.
This period of history has gripped non-Spanish imaginations at least since Washington Irving published his Tales of the
Alhambra in 1832, but interest was revived for Hispanists
during the unsettling era of Francisco Franco’s regime. The
20th century saw in Spain a nationalist crisis, as scholars
attempted to reconcile the glories of a past empire with “the
‘enigma’ of modern Spain . . . hopelessly out of step with,” and
18 and 20 for a discussion of Pidal’s contributions to Spanish
historiography and Castro’s revisionist response.
10 Soifer, “Beyond Convivencia,” 20.
11
Ibid., 21.
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demonized by, “the rest of Europe.” 12 Spain labored not only
under the weight of current political and economic troubles, but
also under the “Black Legend” of inquisition and genocide that
had dogged her since the 17th century—and which Nightingale
has perhaps unwittingly restated. Perceived by Europe as
backwards, persecutory, fanatic, Spain herself did not seem to
know what to do with her history and current identity.
This deep anxiety and pessimism, mingled with a contradictory sense of nationalist pride, underlies the works of
Américo Castro. His España en su historia: cristianos, moros,
y judios, published in 1948, while Castro was in exile in the
United States, was written as a corrective to popular views of
Spanish history. It was not meant, however, merely as an effort
to regain historical truths for their own sake, but as a wake-up
call to the nation of Spain. “The greatest service that historiography can offer in these times, replete with threatening omens,
is to nail down the reasons for our deficiencies, to comprehend
how it is that as a people we were so grandiose in our past
undertakings and are so uneasy, troubled, and failure-prone
today.” 13 This required an understanding of “how the inner
habits of Spanish life have been formed” 14—a goal Castro
insists cannot be achieved using the “economicomaterialistic
reasoning” of the then-popular Annales school of historians. 15
12

Kenneth Baxter Wolf, “Convivencia in Medieval Spain: A
Brief History of an Idea,” Religion Compass 3, no. 1 (2009): 73.
13 Américo Castro, “The Millennium Between ‘España’ and
‘Español,’” in An Idea of History: Selected Essays of Americo
Castro,” trans. and ed. Stephen Gilman and Edmund L. King
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), 216.
14 Américo Castro, “The Spanish People,” in An Idea of History: Selected Essays of Americo Castro,” trans. and ed. Stephen
Gilman and Edmund L. King (Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 1977), 190.
15 Américo Castro, The Spaniards: An Introduction to Their
History, trans. Edmund L. King and Selma Margaretten (University of California Press, 1971), 3. Castro finds nothing good to say
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Questions of economics and demographics fail to reach the
heart of the issue, which for Castro is the forging of a collective
identity; what is important in his history are thus not “numerical
figures” but “acts of human will and volition,” not structures
and environmental influences but the ways in which people
conceived of themselves and then articulated those conceptions. 16
Since “language makes history comprehensible” and is “a
way of expressing and interpreting life,” Castro turns to his
own area of expertise, philology, to elucidate this question of
identity-formation. 17 Himself a literary critic (with an especial
focus on Cervantes), he focuses on works “expressive of
collective life” 18—classics such as the Poem of the Cid, whose
structures and vocabularies reveal much about the social milieu
in which they were written. What they revealed to Castro was
the absurdity of the traditional view held by Hispanists, who
believed in an innate, eternal “Spanishness” running through all
of Iberian history and who conflated modern Spanish identity
with that of the peninsula’s oldest inhabitants. 19 In Castro’s
of the Annales, whom he sees as materialistic and dangerously
dismissive of the human side of life. He is especially critical of
Fernand Braudel, whose The Mediterranean “confers the function
of actors in human history on natural elements and population
statistics” (7). Castro is vitally concerned with recovering the
status of human agency in history, although he admits acerbically
that he “sounds anachronistic and reactionary today” (6).
16
Ibid., 10.
17 Ibid., 14.
18 Ibid., 89.
19 “The Spaniard,” Castro observes sarcastically, “considers
himself virtually an emanation from the soil of the Iberian
Peninsula, or at least a being as ancient as the prehistoric Peninsular cave dwellers. . . . Thus the Spanishness of the prehistoric
inhabitants in the mountainous regions of the Province of Santander continues uninterrupted in the people who make cheese in the
grottos of Cabrales”; ibid., 20.
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view this myth is debunked through even a cursory study of the
word “españa” itself, which was not adopted by the inhabitants
of what we now call Spain until the late-13th century; prior to
this, there was no unified Spanish identity, only local affiliations and the common bond of being Christian. 20 To apply the
term “Spaniard” prior to the Muslim invasion of 711 was to
him a painful anachronism, for that identity was produced only
by the convivencia, the long period of “living together”
following the arrival of the Moors.21 “The Spanish people came
into being,” Castro insists, “in a process starting in the eighth
century and continuing through the Muslim invasion, as a
conglomeration of three castes of believers—Christians, Moors,
and Jews.” 22
This convivencia, as Castro saw it, was not a utopia but a
tolerance brought about by circumstances: in the long process
of Reconquista, the Catholic states of Spain were required to
keep themselves in constant readiness for war either with each
other or with the Muslims, and thus had no time for scholarly
achievements. It was necessary, then, for rulers like Alfonso
VI of Leon and Castile (1040-1109) and Alfonso X of Castile
(1221-1284) to adopt what Castro considers the uniquely
Islamic practice of religious toleration, enabling them to take
advantage of the intellectual and administrative skills provided
by non-Christian subjects. 23 This tolerance, however, was the

20

Américo Castro, “The Millennium Between ‘España’ and
‘Español,’” 206.
21 Castro, “The Spanish People,” 191.
22 Ibid., 188.
23 Of the cultural efflorescence during the reign of Alfonso X
“The Learned,” for example, Castro writes, “Arabic sciences and
technical knowledge were imported by the Castilian Christian
because of their practical and artistic efficacy. . . . The Jew served
as an intermediary between the Moor and the Christian in many
ways, and through him the Castilian of the dominant caste was
able to become master of his lands, conqueror of the Moor, and
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result of necessity. Once the “Hispano-Christian” grew in
power and no longer required the cooperation of the other two
“castes,” his obsession with religious purity and his will to
dominate drove him to expel them from the peninsula. 24 From
this act Castro traced the story of Spain’s artistic and intellectual decline, perpetuated by historians who ignored the Jewish
and Muslim influence upon Spanish identity and continued to
cultivate the myth of the “eternal Spaniard.”
One such historian, from Castro’s perspective, was
Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz, who wrote his 1956 España: un
enigma histórico in response to Castro’s thesis. He did not
deny, of course, that Muslims and Jews had lived alongside
Christians in medieval Spain; what he did reject was the idea
that non-Christian cultures had had a formative role in the
creation of Spanish identity. In his view, there was a fundamental Spanish identity that could not be essentially altered
by contact with other cultures; and this identity could be seen,
not in the supposed tolerance of convivencia, but in the “passion . . . for divine war” that moved the common people to acts
of violence against Jews and Muslims. 25 Convivencia was a
state of existence imposed upon society by the elite, but it was
fundamentally at odds with the eternal Spanish character that
valued religious unity above all. 26
If Sánchez-Albornoz’s critique of convivencia has ultimately endured, Castro nevertheless got the better of the debate
in the short term. His position was more or less recapitulated in
eventually executor of the Hispano-Hebrew prophecies of imperial
dominion of the world.” Castro, The Spaniards, 539.
24 Castro, “The Spanish People,” 197.
25 Novikoff, “Between Tolerance and Intolerance,” 23.
Sánchez-Albornoz’s work, unlike Castro’s, has not been well
translated into English (a fact which itself speaks volumes
regarding the outcome of the debate); comments on his España in
the present essay must therefore draw upon other historiographical
articles, such as Novikoff’s.
26
Ibid., 23.
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1985 by J. N. Hillgarth, whose “Spanish Historiography and
Iberian Reality” investigates the “power of certain myths” in
Hispanist literature.27 One such myth sprang from the pen of
Isidore of Seville, who envisioned the Goths as the people
chosen by God to rule over Spain, and this myth has continued
in various manifestations throughout Spanish history. Hillgarth
believed that the Isidorian myth powerfully motivated Ferdinand and Isabella’s efforts to unite the peninsula under their
own Catholic banner when it was revived in the 15th century, 28
and he saw it breathing still in the 20th-century writings of
“eternal Spain” historians like Sánchez-Albornoz. Américo
Castro, too, was “inspired by a myth,” one that “can be summed
up in the word he often uses, convivencia.” 29 Yet Hillgarth
found Castro’s myth more fruitful, less untrue, than that of
Sánchez-Albornoz. For “despite many outbreaks of intolerance
. . . Christians, Jews, and Muslims did coexist for centuries in
Spain—unlike the rest of Western Europe,” 30 and in the late
15th century Spain, “which had rested on the support of three
religions, was thrown out of balance by the removal or denial of
two of the three.” 31 Convivencia thus remained to Hillgarth
what it was to Castro: an idealist concept, a “myth” or construct
of a people’s identity, important in its oppositional nature to the
myth of an eternal Spain.
By the time Hillgarth wrote, however, historians were already “engaged in correcting Castro’s mistakes”32 and, in the
27

J. N. Hillgarth, “Spanish Historiography and Iberian Reality,” History and Theory 24, no. 1 (1985): 23.
28 Ibid., 29.
29 Ibid., 33.
30 Ibid., 34.
31
Ibid., 32.
32
Ibid., 33. Hillgarth, while obviously favoring Castro, nevertheless admits here that Castro “sometimes forced [the consequences of cultural contact] further than the evidence allowed.”
Thus, Hillgarth seems to have generally approved of the corrective
work of colleagues like Glick—although he takes issue with what
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process, substantially reinterpreting convivencia. The most
influential scholar in this pursuit was Thomas F. Glick, whose
1969 article “Acculturation as an Explanatory Concept in
Spanish History” (with anthropologist Oriol Pi-Sunyer) and
1979 monograph Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early
Middle Ages introduced a sociological perspective to the study
of the convivencia. Alex Novikoff aptly sums up Glick’s
perspective as “‘post-Castro and post-Sánchez-Albornoz,’ that
is, steering clear of the quest for national origins.”33 Indeed, in
the last half of the 20th century, the fascination with such quests
was becoming less popular as the very definition of a “nation”
was heavily revised. Whereas Castro could speak of a “progressive formation of the [Spanish] WE,” traceable “in documents, oral literature, or works of art as it attains its collective
plenitude,” 34 by the 1970s-80s theorists were dismissing such
philological foundations of nationalism out of hand: “Nations
as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent
though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth,” Ernest
Gellner stated definitively in 1983. “What do exist are cultures,
often subtly grouped, shading into each other, overlapping,
intertwined.” 35 Similarly, Glick expressed disappointment with
both Castro and Sánchez-Albornoz for fixating on “the issue of
modal personality.” 36 Proclaiming the debate officially over—
since “however one may approach it, the central phenomenon
of medieval Spain . . . is the meeting and bilateral adjustment of
he sees as Glick’s heavy-handed critique of convivencia (see ibid.,
34).
33 Novikoff, “Between Tolerance and Intolerance,” 30.
34 Américo Castro, “The Historical ‘WE,’” in An Idea of History: Selected Essays of Americo Castro,” trans. and ed. Stephen
Gilman and Edmund L. King (Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 1977), 320.
35
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press, 1983), 48-49.
36 Thomas F. Glick, Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early
Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 10.
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two distinct cultures, Christian and Muslim” 37—Glick encouraged his compatriots to step outside its constraints. Convivencia, he and Pi-Sunyer argued in 1969, was a (necessary)
statement of the obvious; what it had not yet been able to
achieve was the “delineation of a structure” of social change.
If such an overarching model was to be developed, “then the
mechanisms and conditions of cultural diffusion must be
described systematically and classified” by sociological
historians. 38
Glick and Pi-Sunyer’s article was primarily theoretical, but
Glick followed his own recommendation in his 1979 monograph Islamic and Christian Spain, adopting a comparative
approach in an attempt to explain, on the macro level, the
processes by which Christian and the Islamic societies shaped
one another in the period of convivencia. Glick’s book reveals
little interest in the effects of “living together” on the consciousness of the modern Spaniard: Glick sees this as a narrow,
idealist way of understanding convivencia, one which failed to
grapple with the effect of historical variables like “power,
wealth, numbers, or technology” on cultural contact and
adaptation. 39 Instead, the work examines Christian and Muslim
societies as two “blocs” with “different cultures . . . [and]
different socio-economic systems” that gave them their
distinctive structures. Implicit in this understanding of Spanish
history is an ironic reversal of Castro’s self-professed “humanism”: where Castro finds the core of society in its literature and
art, Glick finds it in the society’s economic structure—whether
“urban-artisanal,” as he characterizes the Islamic society, or
“static-agrarian,” as he terms the Christian. 40
37

Thomas F. Glick and Oriol Pi-Sunyer, “Acculturation as an
Explanatory Concept in Spanish History,” Comparative Studies in
Society and History 11, no. 2 (1969): 138.
38
Ibid., 147.
39 Glick, Islamic and Christian Spain, 296.
40 Ibid., 6. Castro would presumably have had the same negative assessment of Glick as he had of Braudel (cf. Castro, The
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Unburdened by the weight of nationalist polemic, and apparently unconcerned with what medieval art reveals about
constructions of identity, Glick approaches Iberian history with
precisely the goal he and Pi-Sunyer outlined in 1969: delineating a structure of social evolution, a model that could be
applied beyond the spatial and temporal borders of medieval
Spain. 41 Beginning the work with a section on “Society and
Economy,” which forms the bulk of the book and includes
discussions of Mediterranean trade networks, ecology, agriculture, settlement patterns, kinship structures, and feudalism, he
moves on to a meticulously divided assessment of cultural
diffusion: of technology, of science, of language. Interestingly,
however, and despite the increased accessibility of local
archives following the collapse of the Franco regime, 42 Glick’s
work is less an original examination of primary sources than it
is a tremendous effort at synthesizing the many focused articles
and sweeping histories already available. He marries topical
studies on (to choose a few examples at random) watermills,
mutton-eating, and the cultivation of cereals with broader, more
theoretical works, including Marc Bloch’s Feudal Society,
Maurice Lombard and Harold Livermore’s structuralist
histories of Spain, and, yes, Fernand Braudel’s The Mediterranean. Castro may have eschewed such a materialistic focus;
but in Glick’s view, as he argued in his 1969 article, only
through this “total history” approach “will the true structure of
Spanish history”—and the true dynamics of convivencia—”be
discernible in full relief.” 43
Spaniards, 6); perhaps fortunately for Glick, however, Castro died
in 1972, seven years before the publication of Islamic and
Christian Spain, and thus did not have the opportunity of reviewing it.
41
Glick and Pi-Sunyer, “Acculturation as an Explanatory Concept,” 138.
42 Novikoff, “Between Tolerance and Intolerance,” 28.
43 Glick and Pi-Sunyer, “Acculturation as an Explanatory Concept,” 154.
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Glick himself was critical of Castro’s term, seeing it as a
“catch-all mechanism used to explain all phenomena of cultural
change contingent upon the contact of cultures, an inclusivity
which obscures what are in reality a number of different
mechanisms” 44; for his own purposes he preferred to use the
term “acculturation,” which, while also a catch-all mechanism,
implies a range of contact-dynamics and has no inherent link to
medieval Spain as a unique phenomenon. 45 Given his ambivalence, it is perhaps ironic that his revivification of convivencia
should have had such profound influence on historiography.
From the 1960s to the 1990s in particular, social historians such
as Robert I. Burns and John Boswell applied his acculturative
model to the burgeoning field of “Mudéjar studies,” which
examined the structure and evolution of Muslim societies under
Catholic rule.46
His substantial contributions to future bibliographies attest
to Burns’ particular influence in this field. Like Glick, his work
44 Glick, Islamic and Christian Spain, 281.

However, he seems
to have warmed to the term or at least come to accept it by 1992,
writing, “Convivencia survives. What we add to it is the admission that cultural interaction inevitably reflects a concrete and very
complex social dynamic. What we retain of it is the understanding
that acculturation implies a process of internalization of the ‘other’
that is the mechanism by which we make foreign cultural traits our
own.” Thomas F. Glick, “Convivencia: An Introductory Note,” in
Convivencia: Jews, Muslims, and Christians in Medieval Spain,
ed. Vivian B. Mann, Thomas F. Glick, and Jerrilynn D. Dodds
(New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1992), 7.
45 Glick and Pi-Sunyer, “Acculturation as an Explanatory Concept,” 138.
46
The term Mudéjar (roughly, “those who stayed”) began to be
used by scholars around the turn of the 20th century to refer to
those Muslims who remained in Iberia after the Reconquest but
who did not convert to Christianity. Morisco, by contrast, refers to
Muslims who converted to Christianity following Ferdinand and
Isabella’s 1492 ultimatum: convert or leave.
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on the late-13th-century crusader society of Valencia was the
product of his interest in “structural ethnology” (he held a
doctorate in anthropology as well as in medieval history47), but
it also owed much to the Frontier Thesis that had been put
forward by Frederick Jackson Turner in his 1893 essay “The
Significance of the Frontier in American History.” Much like
Castro’s articulation of convivencia itself, Turner’s central
argument—that American exceptionalism was the product of
“the existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession,
and the advance of American settlement westward” 48—was
largely rejected by subsequent historians even while they
“salvaged elements from the Thesis, rearranged in novel
forms.” 49 One of these new forms was the concept of the
frontier not as unique to North America, but in fact ubiquitous
in Western history: in 1958, for instance, Archibald R. Lewis
argued that “few periods can be better understood in the light of
a frontier concept than western Europe between 800 and 1500
A.D.” and urged historians to investigate these centuries “in the
light of a frontier thesis.” 50

47

Lawrence J. McCrank, “R. I. Burns as Ethnologist and Historian of the Old World and the New,” in Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages, ed. P. Chevedden, D. Kagay, and
P. Padilla (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 1996), 2:20.
48 Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier
in American History,” (American Historical Association, 1894;
Reprint, Mansfield Centre, CT: Martino Publishing, 2014), 3.
49 Burns himself, while rejecting the core of the thesis and
admitting that Turner himself would be unlikely to recognize its
various adaptations, nonetheless paid homage to it—not least in
the title of his influential essay “The Significance of the Frontier in
the Middle Ages,” in Medieval Frontier Societies, ed. Robert
Bartlett and Angus MacKay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989);
quote at 309.
50 Archibald R. Lewis, “The Closing of the Medieval Frontier,
1250-1350,” Speculum 33, no. 4 (1958): 475.
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It was this “neo-Turnerian” conception, along with a redefinition of the frontier not as “free land” waiting to be
claimed by whites but as “zones of intercultural contact,” that
Burns drew upon in his own research. 51 “The analogy of the
colonial experience itself with those of the sixteenth and later
centuries is clear,” he states in his 1984 magnum opus,
Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the Crusader Kingdom of
Valencia: “the seizure and control by a dominant alien minority, supported from the homeland, growing by steady immigration, disdainful and wary of the native population.” 52 In
numerous essays, and with extensive research into the “marvelous and varied registers” of the conquering monarchs, 53 Burns
investigates the impact of these colonizers upon the social
structure of the colonized in terms less of convivencia than of
acculturation. When Muslim society survived in Valencia, it
was not because of enlightenment on the part of the Catholic
conquerors; it was because of the resilience of the Muslim
culture and its ability to “recrystallize” after the shock of
contact.54 The coexistence and cooperation of Muslims, Jews,
and Christians to which the archives attest “was not,” Burns
stresses, “tolerance. Neither people would have conceded that
our modern tolerance was a virtue; neither could have sympa51

Burns, “The Significance of the Frontier,” 310.
Robert I. Burns, SJ, Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the
Crusader Kingdom of Valencia: Societies in Symbiosis
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), xviii.
53
Ibid., xv. Burns acknowledges that cross-cultural interactions
were not written about directly; historians must come at the
question through the “patient archeological probing” of official
documents, which “tend to stress legal disabilities, tax collections,
administrative interventions, religious tension, the chronique
scandaleuse of the police blotter, and clashes at arms” (12). In
Muslims, Christians, and Jews these records include surrender
documents, edicts and charters, and lawsuits—particularly those
related to land ownership and boundary disputes (see 237-238).
54
Ibid., 50.
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thized with our secular-humanistic principles. But it was a
modus vivendi, an experience not without its human warmth
and practical respect for irreconcilable difference. And it
provided an effective ground for unremitting cultural interchange.” 55
Nor was Burns the only one to argue that questions of tolerance and intolerance, exclusion or convivencia were the
wrong ones to ask. In his influential 1977 work The Royal
Treasure, John Boswell also approached the case of Muslims
living under the Crown of Aragon through the untapped riches
of royal archives. His focus, however, was on the mid-14th
century, and in his introduction Boswell defined his approach
vis-à-vis an earlier work by Burns:
His study [Islam under the Crusaders (1974)] is, therefore, one of a society just beginning to establish its internal organization; indeed, what primarily interests Fr.
Burns is the mechanisms and dynamics of the establishment of Christian hegemony over a Muslim population. The following study, on the other hand, is an effort
to examine the position of Muslims once this hegemony
was securely in place, i.e., what life was like for an
established dissident minority. 56
Using royal letters, tax records, legal cases, and laws, Boswell
sought to elucidate the “symbiosis” that existed between the
Catholic monarchs of Aragon and their mudéjar subjects, and
thus to “reconstruct” the “broken and crumpled spider’s web”
of convivencia. 57
In Boswell’s view, however, it was critical that students of
Spanish history not swing to extremes either of oppression or
social harmony when considering this symbiotic relationship.
55

Ibid., 51.
John Boswell, The Royal Treasure: Muslim Communities
under the Crown of Aragon in the Fourteenth Century (Yale
University Press, 1977), 18.
57
Ibid., 12.
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The case of the mudéjar was full of “paradoxes” 58 and “contradictions” that could not be understood by naively asking
“whether Muslims were ‘well’ or ‘ill’ treated or whether the
Christians of Aragon-Catalonia-Valencia were ‘kind’ or ‘cruel,’
‘tolerant’ or ‘intolerant.’” 59 Rather, an exploration of shifting
royal policies from monarch to monarch revealed that the
mudéjars’ situation as a minority and their integration into the
larger society were contingent upon such “historical factors” as
war, finance, demographics, and the whim of the ruling class,
and differed from region to region. 60 In Aragon, for instance, a
long period of acculturation and a small mudéjar population
may have allowed for a certain degree of “convivencia based on
mutual acceptance and supra-ethnic loyalty.” 61 By contrast,
“co-existence between the ethnic groups in Valencia was
simply that: co-existence.” 62 The differences boiled down to
socio-historical factors:
In no case could it be argued that the general situation of
Muslims, whether desirable or undesirable, was due to
the bigotry or tolerance of particular Christians, or to the
enlightenment or fanaticism of the ruling classes, or to
the justice or injustice of Christian authorities. The
situation of the Muslims and their relation to Christian
society around them was created and maintained by
organizational and structural forces which operate on
most pluralistic societies, which respond to stress by
exaggerating social distinctions and cleavages regardless
of the desires or wishes of individuals involved, and
which are better analyzed in terms of their effects than
their moral desirability. 63
58
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Ibid., 404.
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61 Ibid., 398-399.
62 Ibid., 400.
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The top-down, institutional version of convivencia, stemming more from Glick’s anthropological approach than from
Castro’s idealist conception of the term, continued to be the
dominant historiographical perspective through the duration of
the 20th century. Concurrently with Burns and Boswell, Elena
Lourie published numerous essays on the situations of both
Muslim and Jewish minorities in Aragon, including several that
were reprinted in her 1990 collection Crusade and Colonisation: Muslims, Christians and Jews in Medieval Aragon. The
compendium also featured an original piece that examined the
sometimes-contradictory, always-ambivalent attitude of the
Aragonese monarchs toward their mudéjar population, which at
once protected Muslims as an economically beneficial minority
and excluded them from the Christian “communitas regni.” 64
Like Burns, Lourie examined royal policy in newly conquered
territories like Majorca and Valencia, looking in particular at
the range of fiscal demands, from ransom payments to tax
burdens, made of the Muslims; and like Boswell, she stressed
the paradoxes of this supposed convivencia in which Muslims
were distrusted by the Crown and hated by the populace, yet
also sought after as colonists and granted royal protection. 65
Also in the early 1990s, Mark Meyerson published his
contribution to this popular field. The Muslims of Valencia in
the Age of Fernando and Isabel: Between Coexistence and
Crusade returns to the Crown of Aragon in the waning years of
convivencia as if to complete the trilogy begun by Burns and
Boswell, this time in an effort “to comprehend more fully the
reasons for the breakdown of convivencia, which for the most
part occurred under the Catholic monarchs, Fernando and his
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Elena Lourie, “Anatomy of Ambivalence: Muslims under the
Crown of Aragon in the Late Thirteenth Century,” in Crusade and
Colonisation: Muslims, Christians and Jews in Medieval Aragon,
ed. Elena Lourie (Hampshire, UK: Variorum, 1990), 2.
65
Ibid., 76-77.

18

Abigail Hartman

wife, Isabel I of Castile.” 66 Again, however, he cautions
against a too rosy view of Spain prior to the rise of these
remarkable rulers: “In both Islamic and Christian societies there
existed a form of institutionalized tolerance of religious
minorities. Yet because this tolerance was institutional, an
artificial governmental creation, it by no means guaranteed a
harmonious intermingling of religious groups.” 67 Indeed, he
challenges the dichotomy inherent in his own title by pointing
out the “latent ideological antagonism” embedded in the
“institutional forms structuring Iberian Christian-MuslimJewish coexistence”—the crusade ideology in the midst of
coexistence, and the coexistence in the midst of crusade. 68
Like Lourie, Meyerson sees the foundation of this tenuous
“living together” as essentially economic, since all layers of
Valencian society depended on the labor and taxes of these
religious others. “The Mudejars could not be extracted [from
the economy] without the entire edifice crumbling,” he writes.
“The fortunes of nobleman, cleric, and burgher were all linked,
some more directly than others, to the Mudejars’ fate,” and for
this reason the elite tended to resist any suggestion that Muslims should be forced to convert or flee.69 Indeed, during the
early part of his reign Ferdinand himself tended to follow in the
footsteps of his “ambivalent” predecessors, being less concerned with the religious purity of the land than with ensuring
“that the Crown received as great a share as was possible of the
economic benefits accruing from the Mudejars’ labor and
enterprise.” 70 Where Meyerson diverges from Lourie is on her
66

Mark D. Meyerson, The Muslims of Valencia in the Age of
Fernando and Isabel: Between Coexistence and Crusade
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); e-book version
distributed by Michigan Publishing, University of Michigan
Library, 4.
67
Ibid., 3.
68 Ibid., 4.
69 Ibid., 143-144.
70
Ibid., 270.
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sharp dichotomy between the attitude of the rulers toward the
Muslims and that of their Christian subjects. Armed with
documents from the Archivo del Reino de Valencia that allow
him to “explore some areas . . . that have been left largely
untouched by scholars working in earlier centuries,”71 he shifts
the historical perspective downward to the host of mundane
economic transactions that took place outside the parameters of
official decree. In light of such data, he argues that, on the
contrary, “the popular Christian view of the Mudejars did not
differ substantially from that of the king.” 72 Christians patronized Muslim shops (the practice of purchasing meat from
Muslim butchers became particularly contentious73), and vice
versa; Muslim artisans bought materials from Christian
suppliers, and vice versa; Muslims established credit with
Christians, and vice versa.
Just as economic considerations dictated royal policies,
then, so in daily life the activities of buying and selling provided the counterweight to the religious exclusivism that might
otherwise have brought latent antagonisms to the fore. 74 “It
was above all the daily interaction between Muslim and
Christian in the workplace and the marketplace,” Meyerson
stresses, “that lent stability to Muslim-Christian convivencia in
Valencia, and allowed for the breakdown of some, although by
no means all, of the social barriers between them.” 75 Violence
occasionally did break out due to “both religious hostility and
economic resentment,” but so long as it was contained by the
71
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73 The manner in which animals were slaughtered had significant religious implications, so that by the late 15th century laws
were being passed forbidding Christians from purchasing meat
from either Muslim or Jewish butchers. The practice was apparently ongoing, however, and continued to plague Ferdinand and
the Inquisition. See ibid., 47.
74 Ibid., 99.
75
Ibid., 271.
72

20

Abigail Hartman

institutions set in place by Lourie’s ambivalent monarchs,
“convivencia was able to persist, much as it always had, with a
potentiality for ethnic violence.” 76 Isolated incidents of
persecutions, however brutal, need not have spelled the end.
These incidents take front and center stage in David
Nirenberg’s 1996 Communities of Violence: Persecution of
Minorities in the Middle Ages, a work which draws upon the
pioneering scholarship of Natalie Zemon Davis in its fusion of
social and cultural history. Despite his subtitle, which reviewers have criticized as misleadingly broad,77 Nirenberg focuses
on the dynamics of “systemic” violence in southern France and
Aragon: anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish crusades in 1320-1321;
ritual “Holy Week” attacks on Jewish communities by their
Christian neighbors; charges of miscegenation levelled against
one group by another. His approach, however, is markedly
different from the tradition of Mudéjar scholarship: rather than
asking questions regarding cultural diffusion, the evolution of
social structures, or even the “experiences” of minorities, he
comes to local and royal archives in order to explore the
“functions and meanings of . . . violence within medieval
societies.” 78 Through this exploration, he questions a teleological understanding of cross-cultural interactions and relative
tolerance or persecution, not only in Spain, but in medieval
Europe at large. Societies like those in Aragon, he argues, did
not degenerate from a state of interfaith harmony into bigotry
and cataclysmic violence; on the contrary, not only eyewitness
accounts of riots but also civic cases—in which minorities were
76
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See, for example, Meyerson’s review, in which he commends the book but questions the applicability of Nirenberg’s
conclusions to regions on the other side of the Pyrenees. Mark D.
Meyerson, “Review: Communities of Violence: Persecution of
Minorities in the Middle Ages,” Speculum 74, no. 2 (1999): 467.
78 David Nirenberg, Communities of Violence: Persecution of
Minorities in the Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University
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habitually accused of such crimes as well-poisoning and
miscegenation—reveal the fact that legal as well as physical
violence was always embedded in society.
Nirenberg’s argument does not seem far removed from the
moderate stance of Burns or Meyerson, who stress that antagonisms were always present in the midst of convivencia; but
whereas Meyerson focuses on the role of economic exchange in
restraining that antagonism, Nirenberg contends that acts of
violence themselves helped stabilize convivencia. 79 In his
chapter on “The Two Faces of Sacred Violence,” for instance,
he makes the case that the ritual reenactment of Passion plays
symbolically integrated Jews into Christian life at the same
time that the ritual stoning of the call (the city’s Jewish quarter)
reinforced the boundaries between the two.80 The rhythmic
quality of these aggressive acts set the parameters within which
coexistence could take place. “Convivencia was predicated
upon violence,” he unequivocally concludes; “it was not its
peaceful antithesis.” 81
Nirenberg’s work, with its focus on interpretation and
meaning rather than large-scale social change or even smallscale minority experiences, represents one of the most dramatic
reinterpretations of Castro’s term to date. More than simply
79

Nirenberg cites approvingly Meyerson’s thesis of “the economic foundations of convivencia,” but emphasizes (as Meyerson
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need preclude violence or hatred.” Rather, such social networks
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40).
80 Ibid., 218. Lucy K. Pick makes a similar argument regarding
the use of polemical literature in maintaining convivencia in her
Conflict and Coexistence: Archbishop Rodrigo and the Muslims
and Jews of Medieval Spain (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of
Michigan Press, 2004); in particular see page 3, where she cites
Nirenberg and draws a parallel between physical violence and the
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“scrap[ing] the varnish of romanticism off the old concept,” as
Soifer has put it, 82 his thesis harkens back to SánchezAlbornoz’s more polemical critiques and throws the very
applicability of the word convivencia into question. Nirenberg
himself sees “no reason why convivencia need designate only
harmonious coexistence” and thus is willing to retain the term,
so long as it is divested of any romantic overtones: one need not
throw out the baby with the bathwater, his work implies. 83
Soifer, however, is not the only recent historian to believe
Nirenberg did not go far enough in his analysis: Brian Catlos
repudiates convivencia altogether in his 2004 The Victors and
the Vanquished. In some ways this work, which examines “the
period in which mudéjar society was born and matured” in
Catalonia and Aragon,84 harkens back to Mudéjar studies; he
nods to his illustrious predecessors and places himself in their
“socio-anthropological tradition,”85 adopting a macro-historical
approach toward the adaptations of Muslim institutions—
financial, ideological, and administrative—to the “trauma” of
conquest. 86 If anything, his work is even more exhaustive in
82

Soifer, “Beyond Convivencia,” 22. Soifer is ultimately unimpressed with Nirenberg’s approach, arguing that it posits
convivencia as a “balancing act” maintained by “an indeterminate
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antagonism and toleration, somehow keeping the whole system in
check. What it does not even attempt to answer is where the
hostility and the need for cooperation come from, and how the
desirable balance is achieved” (23). This seems, however, to be an
oversimplification of historians like Nirenberg or Meyerson, who
are very much interested in the mechanisms whereby convivencia
was maintained.
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analyzing law codes, court cases, and tax records in order to
understand the degree to which Muslims were integrated into
the conquering society. He acknowledges that “no such study
of a minority community can be complete . . . without endeavoring to understand how individuals were affected,” and thus
concludes his work with a series of six microhistories that focus
on the dynamics of inter-cultural exchange at the local level.
Yet these case studies—unlike Meyerson’s review of economic
transactions or Nirenberg’s examination of ritual violence—are
primarily administrative, and are in fact less concerned with the
experience of individual mudéjar than with the relationship
between the judicial systems of the conquerors and of the
conquered. 87
This relationship, he concludes, could be relatively symbiotic despite its many tensions. He is reluctant, however, to call
the symbiosis convivencia, a term he refers to in a more recent
work as “flawed and nebulous” 88 and associates with a false
and anachronistic belief in a tolerant Spain. In an almost
verbatim endorsement of Burns’ thesis, he observes that “the
liberties which [the mudéjar] enjoyed did not result from an
impulse of ‘tolerance’ on the part of the count-kings—this is a
concept which is hardly regarded as a virtue today and was
certainly not in the thirteenth century.”89 Rather, individual
Christians and Muslims (and, by extension, Jews) must be
understood as operating within a number of social spheres in
addition to the religious, any of which could dictate the terms of
social interaction at a given time—sometimes violent, some-

87
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88 Brian A. Catlos, Muslims of Medieval Latin Christendom, c.
1050-1614 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 89.
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times amicable.90 At all times, however, this interaction was
dependent upon numerous pragmatic factors. Catlos even
coined a new word for it: conveniencia rather than the too
idyllic convivencia. 91
“Catlos,” Soifer notes with what might be approval and
might be derision, “cuts through the Gordian knot of issues
surrounding convivencia by rejecting it altogether.” 92 Yet it
appears that Catlos, in his effort to distance himself as much as
possible from associations like Nightingale’s, has created with
conveniencia a view of medieval Spain as problematic as that
generated by convivencia. Where the latter may be accused of
overstating ideology and thus minimizing the pragmatic
calculations involved in coexistence, Catlos’ new term risks
overstating pragmatics and dismissing altogether the ideological underpinnings for the practice of tolerance in the medieval
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Ibid., 389. A similar argument is put forward by Jonathan
Ray, who argues that convivencia should be reassessed from the
perspective of the minorities themselves (in Ray’s case, this
minority is the Jews rather than the Muslims). Like Catlos, Ray
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period. 93 Hillgarth might call conveniencia a new myth,
important in its critique of the more romantic notions associated
with convivencia, but nonetheless incapable of presenting a full
picture of the dynamics of medieval Spain.
And this is, perhaps, at the heart of the convivencia critique: it fails to capture historical reality. As conjured by
Nightingale, with its burden of wonder and nostalgia for what
another popular author has called “A Vanished World,”94 it can
even distort that reality. On the other hand, the responsibility
for these distortions cannot all be laid, as Soifer seems inclined
to lay them, at the door of convivencia, for scholars like Glick,
Boswell, and Nirenberg attest to the fact that the “nuts-andbolts explorations of interfaith existence” that she craves can be
made without rejecting the term. 95 Rather, the misrepresentations spring from the complexities, ambiguities, and apparent
contradictions of medieval Spanish society itself. Medieval
Spain cannot be summed up in a single word, whether that
word be convivencia or conveniencia, for each was present in
93 Pragmatism may indeed have been the largest single factor in

the case of Spain. Over the last several decades, however, there
has been a historiographical reaction against the too rapid dismissal of “tolerance as a medieval virtue,” and there are many who
would question Burns’, Boswell’s, or Catlos’ claims that to speak
in terms of toleration is anachronistic. See, for instance, John
Christian Laursen and Cary J. Nederman (eds.), Beyond the
Persecuting Society: Religious Toleration Before the Enlightenment (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998); also
István Bejczy, “Tolerantia: A Medieval Concept,” Journal of the
History of Ideas 58, no. 3 (1997): 365-84.
94 Chris Lowney, A Vanished World: Medieval Spain’s Golden
Age of Enlightenment (New York: Free Press, 2005). Lowney’s
post-9/11 book is heavily influenced by contemporary issues, and
is suffused, even more than Nightingale’s Granada, with a
despairing nostalgia for the “common society” that medieval Spain
almost attained (see p. 14).
95
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different ways and at different times; popular and scholarly
treatments of the era from Catlos to Nightingale are thus most
problematic not when they employ a particular term, but when
they attempt to use a single paradigm to the exclusion of all
others. Novikoff, who refers to the debate as an “historiographical enigma” and seems uncertain what to make of it, nonetheless acknowledges this point: “The contrasting images one is
presented with” in scholars’ reinterpretations of convivencia
“are themselves evidence of a world more varied, more
changing, and more complex than any overarching concept or
generality can convey.” 96
Paradoxically, that has been the charm of convivencia
since 1948. It suggests more than it tells, and its tantalizing
suggestions have continually fueled research—by those who
reject it as well as by those who accept it. What was convivencia? How was there coexistence? Was there tolerance, or is
tolerance the wrong frame to use? What made Spain unique, or
was Spain unique at all? What motivated the rulers, and what
motivated the common folk in their daily life? Was society
harmonious or conflictive, or are the two mutually exclusive?
Convivencia has not stopped the questions being asked, nor has
it hindered scholars from proposing thoughtful answers. If it is
a myth, it nevertheless seems to be a more fruitful one than
Soifer has given it credit for—Nightingale’s new book notwithstanding.
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REBUILDING GERMANY’S CHILDREN:
THE NAZI INDOCTRINATION AND
POSTWAR REEDUCATION OF THE
HITLER YOUTH
Elizabeth Fox

Introduction
On May 8, 1945, as the Allies advanced deep into German
territory, the Third Reich disintegrated. In the aftermath of
World War II, the horrors of the Nazi dictatorship were fully
exposed when the Nazi political foundations finally crumbled,
reflecting the wreckage of most German cities, such as Berlin.
German civilians were left to rebuild their country, their lives,
and the German psyche. As they looked upon the debris of
their homes and towns, the Germans were traumatized, lost, and
helpless; the once proud and mighty Nazi national identity was
shattered. As a result, they turned to the German youth
population to shoulder the great burdens of reconstruction, the
majority of whom had participated in the Hitler Youth and were
also psychologically devastated and lost. Günter Grass, former
Hitler Youth member of the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg, once reflected on having been in the Hitler Youth
generation of Germany, noting that he felt “too young to have
been a Nazi, but old enough to have been formed by the Nazi
regime.” 1 Despite having been formerly molded and shaped by
Nazi indoctrination, Germany’s youth became the best hope for
1
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the future and, through reeducation and democratization, the
means through which Nazi principles could be extricated from
the German consciousness. In the author’s opinion, the accounts of former Hitler Youth members and other German
adolescents do, in fact, attest to the shift towards democratization. One of the postwar tasks at hand was the reconstruction
of the German ideology, especially that of the youth, to enable
this formerly proud people to come to terms with events during
the war and how best to move forward. The rebuilding of
Germany’s children was the daunting mission facing the Allies
and German citizens.
This essay will examine the success or failure of democratization in Germany after World War II through an examination
of postwar memoirs of former Hitler Youth members, as well
as an oral history interview with a former member, Erich
Neumeier [Fig. 1]. It explores whether or not those who looked
back on their participation in the Hitler Youth continued to base
their lives on the Nazi ideals with which they had been indoctrinated or if their reeducation during the rebuilding of
Germany after World War II was a success. While the brainwashing of German adolescents was accomplished through the
regime’s schooling, physical training, and Fascist pageantry of
the Hitler Youth organization, this essay will argue that the
ultimate disintegration of Germany at the end of the war and in
the postwar period, combined with the Allied efforts at postwar
reeducation and democratization, successfully influenced a shift
away from Nazi ideals; the formerly indoctrinated youth were
the first to be influenced. In the wake of the indisputable
failure and disillusionment of the Germans, Nazi principles
simply could not withstand the impending wave of democracy
that began to affect postwar Germany.
Notes on the Evidence
In order to discuss contextually the Hitler Youth and the
Allied postwar reeducation in Germany, one must describe the
methodology undergirding the evidence used in this essay. The
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Figure 1. Portion of Erich Neumeier Interview, page 1.
Conducted on April 6, 2016.

majority of primary and secondary sources provide comprehensive histories on how both the processes of Nazi indoctrination
and Allied postwar reeducation policies shaped the ideologies
of German youths. However, various historical accounts have
placed little emphasis on critically evaluating the postwar
memories of former Nazi youths. Debates on whether democra-
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tization was extremely successful have occurred amongst
historians. When discussing studies made by German scholars
such as James Tent decades after the postwar period, historian
Jaimey Fisher claims they did not grasp the impact of reeducation in its cultural and social context; instead “these studies
generally focus on (re)educational policy and neglect the wider
public sphere debates about generation and ‘the German youth’
as well as their consequences for German culture and national
identity more generally.” 2 Konrad Jarausch also agrees with
Fisher that postwar discussion and analysis have in the past
focused on the history rather than addressing the question of
democratization. He argues that the problematic aspects of the
entire process were largely ignored by Whig history, which
emphasized the optimistic long-term success (albeit a significant aspect of democratization) rather than perspectives of the
process at the time. 3 With respect to the views of these historians, attempts will be made to trace what democratization meant
to German youths by analyzing the memories and perceptions
of former Hitler Youth members.
The methodology in this essay places primary importance
upon tracing the postwar memory of German youths and
creating a thoughtful analysis of their narratives. The problem
underlying most of these postwar memories, mainly those of
Erich Neumeier, is their silence concerning their participation
in furthering the Nazi cause as Hitler Youth members, as well
as their roles and thoughts during the democratization process
that transformed post-1945 Germany. For instance, in my
interviews with Neumeier, not once did he comment on Hitler,
anti-Semitism, or the treatment of the Jews. Former Hitler
Youth members such as Neumeier, Alfons Heck, and Günter
2

Jaimey Fisher, Disciplining Germany: Youth, Reeducation,
and Reconstruction After the Second World War (Detriot: Wayne
State University Press, 2007), 15.
3 Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans,
1945-1995, trans. Brandon Hunziker (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006), 131.
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Grass indicate that they viewed their experience in the youth
organizations as times of social fellowship, rather than Nazi
indoctrination; this leads to the question, in Neumeier’s case at
least, whether or not his silence is possibly still a remnant of
postwar guilt, shame, and denial manifesting itself. A number
of sociological studies have deeply analyzed the problem of
silence that afflicted postwar Germany regarding Nazi atrocities. In the article “Towards a Science of Silence: The Consequences of Leaving a Memory Unsaid,” this type of postwar
silence is termed by sociologists as mnemonic silence, meaning
“the absence of expressing a memory,” whether intentional or
unintentional, overt or covert.4 It shows that silence sometimes
does not mean actual forgetting but the act of trying to forget.
The article categorizes this silence as “refusing to remember
overtly while remembering covertly”; and it is perhaps done by
Neumeier as he is justifying his Hitler Youth experience and
innocence as a young naïve man who never got to fully
participate in democratization due to his move to America. In
this category, deception can be involved, but the motivations in
refusing to remember can occur because “speakers are tuning
what they say to the perceived attitudes or expectations of their
audience, articulating some aspects of their memory while
leaving others unmentioned.” 5 The article also mentions the
rebound effect, in which intentional silences may not elicit
greater forgetting, but ironically “can actually make speakers
more likely to remember the suppressed material in the future
4

Charles B. Stone, et al., “Towards a Science of Silence: The
Consequences of Leaving a Memory Unsaid,” Perspectives on
Psychological Science 7, no. 1 (2012): 39.
5 Ibid., 41. While I do not doubt Neumeier gave a true account
of his life in the Hitler Youth based on what he experienced and
perceived as a young boy (since he was not mature enough to
realize the consequences of his participation), it is possible that he
failed to acknowledge or willingly admit how he felt about Nazi
indoctrination in the Hitler Youth after decades of realizing the
extent of Nazi atrocities.
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rather than to forget it.” 6 This explains how postwar accounts
like those of Alfons Heck and Günter Grass are created and
analyzed years after the postwar period, the time when they
remained silent in order to focus on finding stability in postWWII Germany. Sociologists Vinitzky-Seroussi and Teeger
similarly argue that “the passage of time may in itself increase
the probability of finding [overt] silence as witnesses pass away
or grow old, and collectives grow bored or tired.” 7 Silence
according to them is a coping mechanism for acknowledging
and remembering the past. Thus, former Nazi German youths
have recently sought to recollect and write down their postwar
experiences years later, as a way of at least claiming some
responsibility for their actions—”keeping completely silent
about certain issues is increasingly becoming a non-option for
many nations [i.e. Germany].” 8 Overall, these sources, including the new interview, further this essay’s analysis of how
postwar memory is analyzed in terms of the history of the
Hitler Youth and the democratization process in post-1945
Germany.
Hitler Youth Background and Indoctrination
In 1926, Nazi politician Kurt Gruber successfully revamped Hitler’s official youth organization led by Baldur von
Shirach, giving it the title Hitlerjugend. The activities and
involvement of the Hitler Youth can be summarized in three
main goals: “to mobilize and to discipline an entire generation
of German youth in the spirit of National Socialism; to loosen

6
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their ties to the Church, the family, and the past; to inculcate the
ideal that the State was everything and the individual nothing.”9
The Hitler Youth can be described as a social organization
with activities that required physical fitness and military
instruction. This obligation involved participation in athletic
games, which indirectly introduced youth to actual military
operations and strategies. In an oral interview conducted by this
author, Erich Neumeier, a former member of both the Jungvolk
and the Hitlerjugend, stated that he remembered participating in
sports activities as well as constructing and flying gliders. In
his written description, he compares his time in both organizations, which he claimed were similar to the Boy Scouts10:
I was in the young volk at 10 years, Hitler Youth at 14
years. Nearly 95% joined both organizations. When
you wanted to belong, you joined. I did not have a rank.
I was just a member. In young volk, we had weekly
meeting, had sport [running, jumping] and building
moder [model] glider airplanes. . . . I did not feel that I
was weaned from my family.
I joined the “pilot” Hitler Youth section. My fondest
memory were learn how to fly a glider. . . . I liked to fly
tremendously. There were other sections of Hitler
Youth; . . . you were free to choose your group after
changing from young volk to Hitler Youth at 14 years.11
9 Craig W.H. Luther, Blood and Honor: The History of the 12th

SS Panzer Division, “Hitler Youth,” 1943-1945 (San Jose: R.
James Bender Publishing, 1987), 13.
10 Erich Neumeier, interviewed by Elizabeth Fox, April 6,
2016, 1. Neumeier was born in 1927 in Ingolstadt, Germany just
outside of Munich on the Danube River. This interview represents
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Hitler Youth before and during the war, as well as his perception
of the postwar reconstruction, democratization, and reeducation
process. Neumeier is a friend of Elizabeth’s grandfather.
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Ibid., 1-2.

37

Furman Humanities Review

In essence, the Hitlerjugend became an important organization that indirectly trained these young men into becoming
Nazi soldiers and fighting machines. The Nazi Schutzstaffel
(Elite Guard or SS) was primarily responsible for supporting
and recruiting young boys from the Hitler Youth, serving as a
connection for members, and, in fact, manipulating them to
enter into SS positions. The SS “fed its insatiable thirst for
power and its penetration into the collective mind and social
fabric by replenishing its personnel from the politically conditioned HJ [Hitlerjugend].” 12
The Hitler Youth’s education on Nazi principles became
the quintessential foundation of the organization that shaped the
activities and training of its members. In addition to teaching
about the race and ideologies of enemies, such as Jews and
Communists, instruction emphasized German history (from its
modern history in 1871 up to the humiliating end of World War
I) and the life of Hitler. Their most important handbook, which
gave an overview of those Nazi principles, was entitled The
Nazi Primer; in it, the goals of the Hitler Youth (“character
building, physical training, and training in the National Socialist worldview”) clearly echoed the ideals emphasized by Nazi
leadership. 13 The Primer outlined complex ideas pertaining to
German population and culture that are ultra-nationalist in
attitude. For instance, the Primer emphasized the need for
racial purification in the German community, which was
presently in danger of creating impure variations in races (or
“hybrids”)—therefore, “a Jew who, during the ‘System Time,’
has assumed a German name and adopted the Christian belief is
and remains a Jew.” 14 In this way, it advocated for the preserva12 Gerhard Rempel, Hitler’s Children: The Hitler Youth and the

SS (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 257.
13
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14 Ibid., 13. “System time” refers to the period of the Weimar
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tion of the Aryan race, the most perfect civilization in the
world, from mixed, abnormal peoples like the Jews, who seek
to corrupt them and the natural order of the universe. This racial
concept was a hidden rejection of democracy that instead
upheld National Socialism as a suitable ideology in creating the
pure, rather than individualistic, German state. William E.
Dodd, the former U.S. ambassador to Germany from 19331937, effectively summarized the overall significance of this
indoctrination as “preparing the way for a Nazified world
where all freedom of the individual, of education, and of the
churches is to be totally suppressed.” 15
These Nazi ideals were espoused by the German youth
who separated themselves from their traditionally conservative
moral guides—namely the church, school, and family unit.
Thus, the Hitler Youth became a modern organization that
appealed to independent young minds, as autonomy was
granted to them as well as the “opportunity for young people to
be respected and responsible.” 16 For example, parental consent
was not required to join the SS Panzer Division or the Hitler
Youth. Additionally, membership into these organizations
eventually became mandatory, breaching the voice of parental
authority and replacing it with that of the State in the guise of
youthful rights of independence. This sparked an intergenerational conflict, specifically between the older generation of the
Weimar Republic and the new, young generation of Nazis. A
former enthusiastic member of the Hitlerjugend, Alfons Heck,
was driven to the Hitler Youth organization as a ten-year-old
due to his “crav[ing] for action” and for freedom from responsibilities. 17 Similarly, devoted Jungvolk member Eberhard
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Weinbrenner learned from his teacher that “by resisting his
parents he exhibited true Heldenmut [heroic courage].” 18
The Hitler Youth also promoted itself as an organization of
opportunity for all those of different backgrounds. The organization’s members were rewarded based on merit rather than
social standing. In their immaturity, selfishness, and ignorance,
these young boys sought power and strength over other children
as they attempted to climb the ranks in their organization and
be rewarded for their military and athletic prowess. In spite of
this desire for Nazi power and leadership, the majority of the
Hitler Youth, primarily its youngest members, were attracted to
join the organization for the camaraderie and Fascist pageantry,
normalizing the organization and its purpose. During his time in
the Hitler Youth, Günter Grass reveled in this youthful fellowship without question: “The wishful thought of [the Hitler
Youth] slogan, Youth Must Be Led by Youth! was backed by
promises of overnight hikes and other outdoor activities in the
woods along the beach.” 19 Erich Neumeier claimed that he had
“a happy childhood, playing soocker [sic], swimming in the
Danube, exploring the neighborhood park. . . . As a young boy,
I heard from my father, actually just good news. My father had
work, our family had more than enough to eat. Germany was
rising industrulic [sic]. I would say [I was] happy and proud to
be a glider training pilot [in the Hitler Youth].” 20 Neumeier
further expressed his disinterest in Nazi politics during his
times in the Jungvolk and Hitler Youth, commenting on the fact
that he never discovered the negative aspects of Nazism (i.e.
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anti-Semitism). 21 To most German youths, their required duty
as German citizens was to participate in the Hitler Youth—
there was no scrutiny of their actions since they did not
understand the hidden political implications of the Nazism they
naively practiced. In essence, as Alfons Heck reflected,
“Children are too immature to question the veracity of what
they are taught by their educators.” 22 Like many of his peers,
Neumeier did not fully realize the implications of his actions,
but was just happy to be a child who “belonged” in a social
organization. This illustrates the brilliance of the Nazi establishment in indoctrinating youth.
Other postwar accounts reveal the realistic tensions of
participation in the organization. Ilse Koehn, a former member
of the German Girl’s League, Jungmaedel, faced hardships in
her organization, providing a different story regarding her
involvement as a half-Jewish girl in the Hitler Youth. Koehn’s
identity as a Mischling (mixed-blood) was a hidden but
common situation amongst other former members. In a classified document titled “Expulsion of A Mischlinge from the
Hitler Youth” from the Archives of the Wiener Library in
London, correspondence and orders from the Chief of the
NDSAP Personnel Office detail the investigation into whether
or not the two sons of Hildegard Becker should continue
membership in the Hitler Youth when it was discovered while
undergoing divorce proceedings that Becker’s mother had a
Jewish identity. 23 In spite of Becker’s declaration that she was
only half-Jewish and that she “obviously tried hard to prevent
expulsion of her sons,” the NDSAP officials rejected the boys’
21
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continued membership in the Hitler Youth, “even if they were
only 1/8 part Jewish.” 24 The situation with Becker and her sons
reflects the danger of being discovered, even with the smallest
remnants of Jewish ancestry. Such threat of discovery could
affect the most loyal Hitler Youth members, as seen in the fear
of Ilse Koehn and her family. Koehn joined the Jungmaedel
because her friends had told her “how much fun they had,
singing and playing all kinds of games”; the real function of
these activities, however, was to instruct these girls on Nazi
philosophy. 25 In one harsh situation, Koehn was forced along
with thousands of Berlin children to evacuate to East Prussia,
when in fact they were sent to Czechoslovakia without the
knowledge of their families; there, Hitler Youth dignitaries,
including Baldur von Schirach, welcomed them. 26 These girls
were told to lie in their letters to their parents that they were
safely secure in their area when in actuality they lived in cruel,
strict, and unfair conditions. This situation focused on forming
the German boys and girls into effective Nazi leaders who
should follow orders regardless of the circumstances.
Overall, while the Hitler Youth organizations had success
in the indoctrination of the youth toward Nazism, it was later
discovered that there were hidden tensions that were revealed in
the aftermath of the war. Many children were affected by the
cruel, unjust exploitation of the Hitler Youth organization. As
Gerhard Rempel remarks, members of the Hitler Youth were “a
generation of misguided idealists. Hitler’s children demonstrated a youthful capacity for fidelity. That loyalty was abused.”27
The transformative experiences and continuous blind loyalty of
the Hitler Youth members to the Third Reich was put to the test
when democratization took control of Germany in the postwar
period.
24
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Stages of Reeducation:
Demilitarization, Denazification, Democratization
The collapse of Nazi Germany in 1945 abruptly ended Nazi indoctrination. In an attempt to salvage the remnants of
German society and reduce the long-term trauma felt by the
German population, the Allies implemented stages for what
they hoped would be successful reeducation leading to democratization. The Allies targeted the youth as the bulwark upon
which Western Germany (also the subsequent new Bonn
Republic) could reconstruct and once again be successfully
integrated into Western society. The phase of demilitarization
divided Germany into zones controlled by the United States,
Great Britain, France, and Russia. Under foreign Allied
occupation, Germany was required to eliminate Nazi military
organizations like the Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS, and Volkssturm
militia. German soldiers willingly underwent this demilitarization process for “fear of being captured, especially by the
Russians, as well as the urge to make their way home unrecognized.” 28 This act of capitulation largely contrasted with the
Nazi militant values and mindset of the Hitler Youth, marking
the first turn for many from militarization to civility.
Denazification became an essential phase in eradicating
Nazi organizations and culture that contained elements of
Fascism. In October 1945, the Allied Control Council issued its
eighth law providing legal ramifications for denazification
measures. These measures effectively “dissolved the
N.D.S.A.P., its formations, and its affiliated organizations, of
which some sixty-two were enumerated, making it illegal to
revive the Party, either under its old name or a new one, and
providing for the confiscation of the Party’s assets, property,

28 Jarausch, After Hitler, 23.

The Germans also desired to have
a normal and peaceful civilian life when leaving the frontlines,
which made disarmament and demobilization easier.
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files and documents.” 29 Additionally, German businesses and
industries were “prohibited from employing former Party
Members in any but the lowest positions,” in order to remove
former members from professional society and reduce their
influence. 30 Censorship was also placed on Nazi films, newspapers, and other media, gradually becoming replaced by its
American alternatives, such as the newspaper Die Neue
Zeitung. One specific Allied attempt of censorship occurred in
German cinema, in which a 1951 film titled Die Sünderin (The
Sinner) in 1951 told the story of a woman who resorts to
prostitution and later commits suicide. 31 The film provoked
uproar in the Protestant and Catholic churches that protested
against the film’s immoral themes. Through such critical
involvement, the church, once a traditional enemy of the Hitler
Youth, became an institutional authority whose mission was to
help rebuild postwar Germany based on conservative values.
As a result, “by the beginning of the Bonn Republic, these wellentrenched interests dominated the process of social and
cultural reconstruction.” 32
Although the majority of Nazi control was effectively
eliminated, historian Konrad Jarausch argues that denazification was largely unsuccessful in the short term. Denazification
boards failed to eradicate most former Nazis from professional
life, which, to be sure, was a difficult and impractical goal to
attain in the short term; they also failed to convince them of
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their collective responsibility in the Holocaust.33 The bureaucratic process of removing ardent Nazis from officer positions
and finding new appropriate officers was slow and unpopular
amongst the German masses. One mayor in Hamburg claimed
that removing former Nazi and SS members would lead to a
“class of disgruntled and sacked ex-Party members” that would
be “dangerous, ill-advised and a threat to law and order”; he
also rejected “employment of proven anti-Fascists and former
concentration camp inmates as contrary to the best interests of
democratic administration.” 34 In spite of such claims and initial
backlash, local governments, primarily in West Germany,
underwent tremendous efforts to purge Nazis from society and
carry out their own programs of denazification. The denazification processes differed with regards to Soviet-controlled areas
versus those of the Western Allies—the Soviets using their own
brand of indoctrination and brutality—but such processes were
underway in all areas of Germany.
Democratization benefited from the reeducation of the
postwar German youth, primarily through the reorganization of
the schools. Upon their reopening, schools faced problems such
as the lack of textbooks approved to replace those that emphasized Nazi propaganda, like The Nazi Primer. In addition, when
observing literacy and general knowledge, it became apparent
that the German children lacked the proper education due to the
former emphasis placed on Nazi indoctrination rather than on
core teachings. Further, democratization required qualified
teachers who were not former Nazi Party members:
In view of the great political responsibility towards the
German youth and future, the prospective teachers are
required—and this point is expressively stressed by the
TÄGLICHE RUNDSCHAU, the paper of the Soviet
command—to belong to those classes of the German
masses that are known for their democratic traditions
33
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and leanings, namely the workers, the peasants and the
working intelligentsia.35
The brutal stages of demilitarization, denazification, and
democratization reflect the long, arduous process of reconstructing Germany to overcome the brainwashing and indoctrination employed by the Nazi Regime in their attempt to control
all aspects of German society.
Responses to Reeducation: Tracing Postwar Memory
The main problem in analyzing postwar memory is the silence of many Germans during the democratization process
extending into the 1950s and 1960s. Author Joachim Fest
admitted that he would not have immediately put pen to paper,
writing his precise early memories, if he had not had a radio
commission to author his account of German history. 36 In
collectively working through his experiences, Fest termed the
post-1945 period as “The Great Denial,” in which the “early
years after the war was later described as a ‘communicative
silence.’” 37 This silence was formed not because of repression
by the Allied forces but because of Germany’s determination to
forget the horrors of their recent past. According to Tubach,
“For mere physical and psychological survival, it was necessary
for us to look forward; to look back meant facing a wall too
high and formidable to be scaled.” 38
Following World War II, German youths, especially older
Hitler Youth members born before 1930, had become disoriented by the reality of National Socialism and its subsequent
destruction of Germany. Amidst the rubble and dilapidated
towns of Germany, they felt lost without the Nazi authoritarian
35
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ideology in which they were raised. Therefore, when the
occupied German state was in the beginning stages of its
democratic transformation, German youths actually protested
against democratization. Initially, many of these adolescents
remained loyal to the Führer and to National Socialism,
believing that democracy would fail like it had with the Weimar
Republic. Their resistance is evidence that actions in denazification were ineffectively carried out in the beginning of the
postwar period. Having been traumatized by the war, these
youths clung to the ideals of Nazism, unwilling to admit their
defeat. The indoctrinated youths continued to claim in the
summer of 1945, “Hitler was a great man who insisted that
‘[Germans] have not really lost the war.’” 39
Proud, nationalistic German youths sought to fight against
Allied control. They believed the American occupiers threatened to change the traditional social and political structures of
German society and replace them with Americanized versions.
Fisher states that there was contention between the Germans
and Americans over Allied educational reforms that Germans
believed would intrude upon other societal aspects of the
German identity. Drawing upon the American “Zook” Report,
Fisher explains that Germans strongly protested proposed
changes in the structure of German schools based on the
American democratic model; this revealed “how youth and
education afforded postwar Germans one last front on which to
fight the Allies and on which to stake their identities.” 40 The
youthful resentment against this Allied control is also reflected
by surveys in the U.S. zone. The majority of Germans opposed
denazification “in practice, most often because they felt that too
many ‘small fish’ were being netted while the bigger ones were
getting away.” 41 Germans claimed that these democratic
39
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policies carried out by the occupiers were ignorant of the
realities of postwar life in Germany. In response to interview
questions, Erich Neumeier stated that he believed the Marshall
Plan, an American initiative that aided to help rebuild postwar
Western Europe, had good intentions but was poorly organized
and lacked understanding of the German people, customs, and
beliefs. This was evidenced in the corn that was sent as a food
ration to the starving German people—however, “in Germany
corn is strictly food for picks [pigs]. So in Germany, Bavarian
people thought the Americans think of us as [pigs].” 42 Despite
their need for such aid, the majority of German youth were
attempting to retain their sense of nationalistic pride for their
country, even in ruins, unwilling to lose their dignity in the face
of such calamity.
Although the former Nazi youth initially protested against
democratization procedures, they also felt betrayed by Hitler
and the Third Reich. While in the organization, Hitler Youth
members became inspired by the German nationalist pride
presented in their ritualistic activities and elaborate spectacles
celebrating Nazism and Hitler’s leadership. Hitler became the
archetype of National Socialism whom all the young boys and
girls placed on a pedestal—as a father figure, he mattered more
than Nazi ideology. 43 Upon swearing their oath of fealty to the
Führer in a ceremonial fashion, the members cast Hitler in a
magical charismatic aura and thereby were inspired by his
majesty; this is just one example of the effect of Nazi pageantry
employed by the organization. Heck discusses an event where
Hitler gave his speech to all the Hitler Youth members, who
were overcome with emotion in hearing him speak; in that
moment, Heck “belonged to Adolf Hitler body and soul.” 44
Their admiration for Hitler and the Nazi ideal turned to shock
when Germany collapsed and suffered through the postwar
period.
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Having been convinced of the invincibility of their Führer,
Nazi Regime, and organization, Hitler Youth members questioned why Hitler’s Third Reich failed so miserably against the
Allied powers. As the Nazi organization failed to protect them
when they suffered from postwar depression, German youths
began to portray themselves as victims rather than perpetrators
of Nazi actions, hence Grass’ observation: “The crimes coming
to light with peace, the flip side of war, were making victims
out of perpetrators.” 45 The victimization of the Hitler Youth
kept them from admitting to themselves and others their
complicity in furthering the Nazi cause against the Jews, raising
the question of whether or not they were blameless. Although
the Hitler Youth members often naively participated in their
activities without fully understanding the actual indirect
purposes—the effects of displaying power and superiority over
younger members, for example—they were ultimately indoctrinated into having a sense of a strong nationalistic and racial
superiority.
In the postwar period, they were held accountable for their
actions against the Jewish race, regardless of their indoctrination as youths. According to historian Tony Judt, postwar
Germany had been democratized and “raised to see Nazism as
responsible for war and defeat; but its truly awful aspects were
consistently downplayed.” 46 When the Adolf Eichmann trial
occurred in 1960 in Jerusalem along with the Auschwitz trials
later in Frankfurt, the German public became exposed to the
evils of the Nazi regime. German youth radicals of the 1960s
then began to claim that the Bonn Republic in West Germany
actively sought to cover crimes formerly committed by Nazi
youths and failed to allow Germans to confront their past—”as
a result, in the eyes of their sons and daughters they stood for
nothing. Their material achievements were tainted by their
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moral inheritance.” 47 These postwar protests represent the guilt
former Nazi youths faced as a refusal of taking responsibility.
Erich Neumeier admitted having “troubles being classified as a
‘Nazi’ criminal,” mainly because he, like many other German
youths, felt that “I was doing the same as the American GIs –
defending my country.”48 However, as Günter Grass explains in
his memoir, “Guilt—whether proven, presumed, or concealed—remains. . . . It says its piece, fears no repetition, is
mercifully forgotten for a time, and hibernates in our dreams.”49
The negative attitudes of the German youths impacted the
reception towards democratization as a failure in the short term,
making it initially difficult to undo the damage of Nazi indoctrination. Former Hitler Youth members who became Allied
prisoners of war felt bitter resentment in losing to the Allies and
were dehumanized through their experiences as Nazi fighting
machines. For instance, Heck was captured by French military
occupiers, who sent him to a penitentiary in Wittlich as a
prisoner of war when they found out he was a Hitler Youth
leader (Bannführer). He went through a process of reeducation,
recalling a time when he viewed documentary films of death
camps with indifference:
The mountains of emaciated corpses had the opposite
effect from what our conquerors intended. We thought
they were fakes, posed to indict all Germans. The
French became so incensed by our indifference that they
rammed us with rifle butts. It was some time before I
could accept the truth of the Holocaust, nearly three
decades more before I could write or speak about
German guilt and responsibility. 50
In a similar way, Günter Grass faced the challenges as a POW
when there were rumors that prisoners would be transferred to
47
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the Soviet zone—great fear struck the hearts of many prisoners.
Grass also mentioned “rumors of a mass release of prisoners,
occasionally combined with talk of shipping the youngest
inmates off for reeducation: to America! They’ll knock the
Hitler Youth out of you, the older soldiers jeered.” 51 The harsh
scare tactics that the Allies instigated began to influence the
POWs, who were radically changed through the reeducation
process—”completely unprepared for a West Germany in the
throes of rapid economic growth and expansion, POWs
appeared as sage observers from another age.” 52
The German youths encountered in their postwar lives a
stage of reexamination of their values, focusing mainly on their
present survival rather than speaking out on their atrocities as
Nazi youths. Having been let down by the fall of the Third
Reich and rejection by the Allies as Nazi criminals, the youths
distrusted their older authorities. As the Nazi foundations that
they wholeheartedly followed became destroyed, the youths
were unsure of where to place their faith; they therefore
frequently withdrew from the community and maintained a
focus only within themselves. 53 These youths displayed a
disinterest towards government matters, taking no sides in party
politics regarding democracy, Nazism, or otherwise — “by
all accounts most Germans were intent on one thing, das
Überleben, or mere survival, and Allied armies were grappling
to impose a victor’s order on the wartime chaos.”54 However,
their social adaptation in a postwar Germany that was slowly
becoming renewed as a nationalist state influenced the evolution of their ideals over time. Algot Joensson, who became a
national director of an affiliate of the Swedish Trade Union
Federation in 1941, provided his perspective on democracy
51
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when compiling an observational report of the Bavarian areas
struck by postwar devastation. He urgently called for the
creation of democracy to rebuild Germany, an initiative that
would be led by its youth, and argued for trade unions to
become the “core of democracy.” 55 His argument sought to
train youth to become progressive contributors in rebuilding the
German society and aiding in its democratic development: this
call was made “in order to be able to reach a judgment on a
problem, [the German youth] will demand facts and, eventually, they will learn respect for facts, for the view of other people
and for people themselves—a respect which is quite necessary
in a democracy.” 56
German youths in the western zones were also influenced
by democratic youth organizations, which were headed by the
Education and Religious Affairs Branch with foreign military
officials guiding their activities.57 According to the U.S.
military’s program guidelines, the democratization process in
these organizations would be “achieved by acquainting the
young people with such activities and interests as woodcrafts
and athletics that were normal to youths of similar age in the
United States.” 58 One German youth, Manfred Fischer, who
was chosen to participate in this re-indoctrination process,
loved this experience, in which “good food, fireside meetings,
talks about America, and simple interactions with the American
soldiers in charge of the youth camp filled the days.”59 These
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organizations represented a quasi-Hitlerjugend that encouraged
the spread of democracy rather than the Nazi cause. Most
importantly, they helped to guide former Hitler Youths to
eventually find their way toward democracy in a newly
developed Germany and, thus, to move Germany toward the
healing of its psyche.
Legacy of Democratization in Postwar Germany
One major effect stemming from the democratization process was the fracturing of unity between East and West Germany. Differences occurred in democratization procedures of the
Eastern zone of Russia and the Western zones of America,
Britain, and France that almost hindered the growth of a new
German nationalism. According to German intellectuals,
Germany suffered from “post-fascist democratic deficit” in
which they sought to create stronger democratic institutions that
pushed against totalitarianism, but struggled to identify with
them. 60 With American influences, West Germany actively
pursued an effective democracy, modeled differently from the
pre-Nazi Weimar Republic, to combat against Nazism; this
zone became increasingly westernized. Conversely, Russia’s
ruthless denazification process created in the East German zone
“a seemingly ‘more German Germany’ steeped in authoritarianism.” 61 For instance, the Free German Youth (FDJ) was
established as a youth organization similar to those in the
Western zones but with communist purposes. While the
organization sought to convert its young members by including
“fun into their activities, using some of the same techniques as
the Hitler Youth,” its main focus was to develop the political
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education system based on socialism. 62 This cruel reindoctrination and aggression of Communists on Eastern
Germany is reflected in the tales of German refugees who
managed to escape from the Eastern zone during the postwar
period—”forcefully separated from their homes and possessions, they desperately needed immediate assistance to compensate them for their losses and integrate them into West
German society.” 63 As Erich Neumeier expressed, even as a
member of the Hitler Youth he did not have much concern for
politics or perceptions of the Jews before the postwar period.
But following the war, his perceptions and concerns were
confused and illustrated the mindset of many Germans:
I was not interested in politics. That the stores of Jews
were marked as “Ich Bin Ein Jude” was a fact of daily
life and really not much concern to me. After the war,
after the Koncentration camp stories became public, I
became uncomfortable. But I ask myself what happened
to the German prisoners of war in Russia? Even up to
date only 20-25% were returned. The rest disappeared
forever . . . and Russia was an alliance of the West! 64
The statistics that Neumeier mentioned foreshadow the fact that
in the wake of World War II, the Soviet Union was creating a
Communist, totalitarian government in its occupied zone of
Eastern Germany rather than aiding in democratization. Thus,
the differences between East and West German political
ideologies served to further divide Germany and confuse its
citizens who were often already lost: in denial, emotionally
distraught, and “uncomfortable” with what had transpired under
Hitler’s Regime.
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Despite the deep political divisions within East and West
Germany, the overall process of democratization throughout
Germany effectively helped restore over time a new German
nation that had formerly been ravaged by postwar crisis.
American foreign occupiers established their influence and new
organizations, such as the Social Democratic Party led by
politicians like Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who sought to
improve the nation’s postwar government. As a result, Germany eventually transformed into a developed and, once again
advanced, nation. Erich Neumeier had moved away from
Germany in 1954, due to the slow recovery of the national
economy. He established his home in the United States, where
prosperity and “easy money” kept him from returning to
Germany. However, after fifteen to twenty years, he arrived in
Germany again, only to find its massive transformation. Erich
and his wife “felt we did not belong the[re] anymore. Only my
brot[h]ers family was importend [important]. Most of our
friends had moved and were not in Ingolstadt anymore.”65 With
the transformation of the West German nation came the
transformation of its youth, who eventually understood and
accepted the evils of Nazism and began to work through their
guilt and embarrassment. The processes of denazification and
democratization were necessary for Germans to come to terms
with their past, helping them become a stronger nation in facing
the consequences for their actions—in doing so, “acknowledgement of their losses unified West Germans; it became
central to defining the Federal Republic as a nation of victims.” 66 In eventually accepting their responsibility for Nazi
atrocities, many former Hitler Youths were able to record
accounts of their perspectives towards Nazism and democracy,
as the past was no longer painful. Their responses helped
Germany move one step closer towards successful democratization in the long term.
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Conclusion
While the initial development of democratization was an
ineffective failure in the short term, it gradually gained success,
as the new West German nation evolved economically and
politically due to the efforts of groups like labor unions and
former Hitler Youth who had come to terms, as best as they
could, with what had occurred during the war.
These former Hitler Youth members began to heal and
work toward uniting the new German youth in their efforts to
democratize Germany. The Hitler Youth’s indoctrination into
National Socialism effectively trained its members as soldiers
for the Third Reich. Yet according to former members Alfons
Heck and Luftwaffe pilot Erich Neumeier, the organization’s
appeal for them lay in athletics and social fellowship, which
used the naiveté of its members to carry out the Nazi cause.
After World War II and Nazi atrocities wreaked havoc on
Europe and the Nazi state collapsed, former Hitler Youth
members struggled to return to normalcy, initially rejecting
Allied efforts of democratization in the process. Nevertheless,
decades of demilitarization, denazification, reconstruction, and
democratization, whether through other youth organizations or
experiences in POW camps, helped fully convince Germany’s
youth of the positive values of democracy. By accepting and
taking responsibility for their actions, the former Hitler Youth
helped Germany emerge out of the economic and political
wreckage of World War II to become a new democratic nation.
Hitler successfully indoctrinated the German youth and
believed he would through them secure Germany’s future in
National Socialism; however, as postwar Germany rose from its
devastation, so too did its people as they learned to remember,
rather than forget their past—”Memory likes to play hide-andseek, to crawl away. . . . When pestered with questions,
memory is like an onion that wishes to be peeled so we can
read what is laid bare letter by letter.”67 Nevertheless, the youth
67
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of Germany, which formerly symbolized the Nazi cause,
became the true hope for Germany in its democratization and
its steps toward healing the German spirit.
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SEX EDUCATION, RAPE CULTURE, AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT:
THE VICIOUS CYCLE
Anna Lanford

One in five women will be sexually assaulted during her
lifetime. 1 Most of these cases do not occur when a stranger
jumps out of the bushes, but with someone familiar to the
victim. In fact, statistics show that sexual assault by an acquaintance is even more common on college campuses. As
stated in Furman University’s Sexual Misconduct Policies,
“Over 90% of campus rapes are committed by friends, acquaintances, or friends of friends.”2 In order to combat the high
rate of sexual assault, both men and women need to have better
understanding of what consent means and that it can be
withdrawn at any time. In the legal context, there are various
state laws and university policies that define consent and sexual
assault. In the philosophical context, scholars such as Lois
Pineau discuss the idea of communicative sexuality, which
could transform the way we perceive both the victims and
perpetrators of sexual assault. In this essay I will argue that the
existing legal methods of determining consent are largely
unhelpful as we can see from the overwhelming numbers of
sexual assaults, especially on college campuses, and that
1
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communicative sexuality should be adopted as the standard for
determining whether an encounter was consensual. I believe
that the way to begin implementing communicative sexuality
would start with more open discussions with young people
about how to lead healthy sex lives instead of the limited sex
education they receive today.
I will start by addressing current laws surrounding rape
and consent. By examining these issues we can better understand how to fix the problems that exist. Legislation regarding
sexual assault offers little protection from abuse involving a
friend or significant other, which constitute the majority of rape
cases. In rape law there exists the idea of generalized consent in
which “consent to prior sexual intercourse either indicates
consent to subsequent intercourse or suggests a greater likelihood that the defendant reasonably believed the victim consented to the later encounter.”3 In fact, until recently there were
many states, such as Delaware and Hawaii, that in certain cases
provided a rape shield exception that “allow[ed] for the
admission of evidence of prior sexual conduct between the
defendant and the victim . . . the more sexual history between
two parties, the more evidence admitted under the rape shield
exception, thereby increasing the likelihood that an inference of
consent [would] be made.” 4 In other words, the evidence of a
sexual history could be used against a victim. This negates the
right to say no at any point in a relationship, harkening back to
the days when a concept such as marital rape did not exist –
when “‘I do’ translated into a blanket, irrevocable consent.”5
Laws like this strip all meaning from the idea that “no means
no” and reinforce female subordination to any male figure,
whether it be her husband, boyfriend, or just an acquaintance.
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In addition to the lack of legal protection from assault by
an acquaintance, women face blame for their sexual assault
when they consented to other sexual acts but not the intercourse
itself. Cases where consent was given to acts preceding a rape
“could be viewed as the victim’s assumption of the risk that her
limited consent will be misinterpreted as full consent.”6 In the
majority of cases there is no witness, and it becomes one
person’s word against another’s. At this point the court must
address two questions: when did either party demonstrate intent
to have sex and what actions or words were used to create the
reasonable belief that consent had been given?7 However, it
may be possible for consent to sexual intercourse to be retracted
once given, which further complicates these questions. Courts
in Maryland, North Carolina, and California have discussed the
idea of postpenetration withdrawal of consent and have all
rejected it as a possibility. But there are indeed certain instances
when a woman could consent to sex only on certain conditions,
such as using a condom, that if ignored, might be considered
sex via deception and therefore rape. In this case, there are
some states that argue that postpenetration rape could be a
separate category from forcible rape, in the same way as rape
by use of fraud or drugs are differentiated. But most of the laws
currently in place leave the victim to prove that she was raped
instead of requiring the accused to show the existence of
ongoing consent.
To be able to fix these unjust laws, we must also understand how consent is legally defined. States such as Wisconsin,
Illinois, Minnesota, Washington, and New Jersey define
consent as “words or overt actions by a person who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”8 Colorado’s
law states that consent is “cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will and with knowledge of the nature
6
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of the act.” 9 In California, consent is defined as “positive
cooperation [or] a continual agreement throughout the sexual
encounter.” 10 Instead of resistance being required to prove
instances of rape, California makes a step in the right direction
when it promotes consent as continuous cooperation, which
does not rely on the revocation of consent for a sexual experience to be considered assault.
But state laws are not the only institutions that provide definitions of consent. Because of the high instances of sexual
assault on college campuses, universities also promote their
own definitions of consent. In looking at one example, Furman
University defines consent as “informed, freely and actively
given, and mutually understandable words or actions that
indicate a willingness to participate in a mutually agreed-upon
sexual activity.” 11 It even goes as far as to say:
Consent cannot be inferred from:
1. Silence, passivity, or lack of resistance alone;
2. A current or previous dating or sexual relationship
alone (or the existence of such a relationship with
anyone else);
3. Attire;
4. The buying of dinner or the spending of money on a
date;
5. Consent previously given (i.e., consenting to one
sexual act does not imply consent to another sexual act); or
6. Accepting an invitation to one’s apartment/room. 12
This addresses many of the issues with general rape laws and
concerns about determining consent. The university’s policies
warn, “Consent may be withdrawn at any time,” which further
supports a person’s right to change her or his mind during a
9
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sexual encounter. 13 However, even the best definitions of
consent, as seen with Furman’s example, fail to protect against
assault as they are put in practice within the context of rape
culture – i.e. attitudes that promote the prevalence of victim
blaming, the normalization of male sexual violence, and the
generally sexist attitudes that contribute to the pervasiveness of
sexual assault within our society. 14 Therefore, I will continue
by analyzing rape culture and how it manifests itself in daily
interactions between men and women.
Simply defining consent does not stop sexual assault from
occurring on this campus or similar campuses across America.
Instead, the existence of rape culture throughout our society
prevents these guidelines from being effective at preventing
sexual assault. Because of this, I will now explain the need for a
change in how our society perceives gender in regard to
sexuality, which would put an end to rape culture. As pointed
out by Lois Pineau in her essay “Date Rape: A Feminist
Analysis,” we assume that the “normal components of romance
include ‘male aggression’ and ‘female reluctance.’”15 These
types of damaging preconceptions can also be seen in the belief
that the victim in some way “asked for it” because of her attire,
flirtatious behavior, or willingness to participate in certain
sexual activities with her attacker. Women are taught that a
man’s sexual needs are uncontrollable and that acting or
dressing provocatively “generates some sort of contractual
obligation” to fulfill this need.16 A provocative woman may
indeed agree to participate in some sexual activity, but she has
little protection from the court if she were to be assaulted.
Oftentimes, this is termed victim-precipitated rape where “the
13
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woman actually or apparently agreed to intercourse but retracted before the actual act or did not react strongly enough when
the suggestion was made by the offender(s).” 17 Lack of consent
alone would not be sufficient evidence to prove that a rape had
occurred. In many instances, there would need to be overt
resistance – for example, evidence of kicking, scratching, or
hitting – that would prove to a jury that the sex was unwanted.
In addition to finding their way into the courtroom and affecting how the legal system deals with rape, these dangerous
misconceptions perpetuated by rape culture about both male
and female sexuality are harmful to the ways in which women
can express their sexuality.
One such side effect of the persistence of rape culture is
“the common belief that many women say no to sex, even when
they mean yes, and that their protests are not to be taken
seriously.” 18 In fact, there exists the idea that rape gives women
“the sexual enjoyment they really want, at the same time that it
relieves them of the responsibility for admitting to acting upon
what they want.” 19 This sexist and unhealthy attitude has even
affected the beliefs that women have about their own sexuality.
Instead of being able to express themselves freely, many
women feel the need to suppress their sexual desires in order to
maintain a “pure” reputation. One study published in The
Journal of Sex Research reveals that 37-39% of women have
actually engaged in token resistance to sex, which is the “sexual
intent to say no to sexual intercourse while meaning yes.” 20 In
these cases, women feel like it would somehow be better for
them to deny their desires because they worry about appearing
17 Rahko, “Acquaintance Rape and Degrees of Consent,” 2347.
18
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promiscuous or they feel that withholding sex is the only way
to have power in their relationship. Women who engage in this
type of behavior are more likely to subscribe to the destructive
patriarchal ideas that it is normal for men to use force to get
what they want and that women are expected to find such
forceful men attractive. 21
The negative connotations surrounding overtly sexual
women prevent them from being able to explore their sexuality
and convince women that they should hide their sexual desires.
At the same time, however, many women agree to unwanted
sex because of “verbal pressure from their partner, need to
conform to peer standards, and desire to maintain the relationship.” 22 Women should be able to turn down sexual advances
and feel able to express their sexuality without fear of repercussions. In fact, not being able to do these things may pose a
threat to a woman’s psychology. In terms of agreeing to
unwanted sex, Robin West demonstrates that women who
engage in this behavior are more likely to damage their selfassertion, self-possession, autonomy, and integrity. Even if they
do not see these negative consequences immediately, these
women can face serious damage to their psyche, for as West
says, “The more thorough the harm . . . the greater the likelihood that the woman involved will indeed not experience these
harms as harmful, or as painful.” 23 Although it may not be clear
on the surface, the way that rape culture affects our society
damages how women can express themselves sexually and the
manner with which we address sex as a whole.
Rape culture also promotes the normalization of sexual
harassment, which is a further form of male power over
women. According to the article “Sexual Harassment and the
University” by Robert L. Holmes, sexual harassment is an
21

Ibid., 126.
Ibid.
23 Robin West, “The Harms of Consensual Sex,” in The Philosophy of Sex, ed. Nicholas Power et al., 6th ed. (Plymouth:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 389.
22

67

Furman Humanities Review

expression of sexism that reinforces the power of men over
women. 24 In the case of universities, sexual harassment can be
seen in both student-on-student and professor-on-student
interactions. The sexual harassment of a student by a professor
represents a violation of trust that prevents “the enrichment and
empowerment of the learner to continue the process of intellectual growth in the ways he or she personally deems best.” 25
Student-on-student harassment is also an “invasion of privacy
[that] jeopardizes the conditions under which learning can best
take place.” 26 To protect against this type of abuse, “a university's concern should extend equally to all of its students” by
providing council to all students involved in cases of sexual
assault. 27
In extending equal concern to all students in regards to
sexual assault, some universities do not treat the accused and
the accuser with the same respect. As Emily Bazelon points out
in “The Return of the Sex Wars,” Harvard law professor Janet
Halley discovered that certain university policies fail to handle
cases of sexual assault properly when they fail to provide
lawyers to students accused of misconduct who cannot afford
them and choose to handle cases internally rather than giving
them over to an impartial outside body. 28 These kinds of
policies are especially dangerous for students of color, who are
more frequently discriminated against. Halley also realized
while working with the LGBT community in the early 90s “that
both men and women could use power and violence against
each other.” 29 Instead of pitting the sexes against each other,
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the way to reach complete equality is to open the lines of
communication. If we can all discuss sexual harassment and
abuse, how to avoid it, and how to prevent it from happening,
entire communities would benefit. In fact, developing mutual
respect and trust within a university campus actually proves to
be more “effective in ending sexual harassment than are threats
and punishment.” 30 Having an open dialogue is important for a
community, but we must also improve communication within
our sexual relationships if we are ever to become comfortable
discussing the subject publicly.
As I have demonstrated, most legal definitions of consent
do not provide adequate protection against assault because they
are warped by the pervasiveness of rape culture and lack of
open communication about sex. I will continue by presenting a
better concept of consent, one that includes the communicative
sexuality model. Honest discussions regarding sex and consent
with any and all partners is required in order to reduce or
possibly eradicate instances of abuse. The first step is altering
our perceptions of what consent means. We need to accept that
one instance of consent is not sufficient, but that every sexual
interaction requires a “reading of whether [your partner] agreed
throughout the encounter.” 31 Lois Pineau calls this continuous
checking in throughout a sexual experience communicative
sexuality. Rather than simply being “concerned with achieving
coitus,” those participating in communicative sexuality should
be focused on the desires of their partner and the ongoing
interpretation of their responses.32 There also exists a mutual
responsibility to “promote the sexual ends of one’s partners”
and also to “know what those ends are [and] . . . how those ends
are attained.” 33 This requirement of communicative sexuality
does not only improve sexual experiences for one and one’s
partner, but also helps pinpoint cases of sexual assault. Instead
30
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of relying on a victim to prove that he or she “resisted to the
upmost,” the communicative sexuality model puts the burden of
proof on the accused to prove the existence of ongoing consent. 34 This way of approaching sexual relationships helps
women in a few ways that the current approach lacks, as it does
not put any emphasis on whether she “was sexually provocative, her reputation, [or] what went on before the sex began. All
that matters is the quality of communication with regard to the
sex itself.” 35
But how do we begin using this method of communication? In her essay “Mutual Respect and Sexual Morality: How
to Have College Sex Well,” Yolanda Estes discusses how to go
about implementing communicative sexuality in a college
community. Like philosopher Thomas Mappes, who argues that
voluntary and informed consent is necessary for any sexual
encounter to be permissible, Estes asserts, “We become familiar
with our common human dignity by engaging in interactions
with others. . . . Manipulating (with lies or other deceptions) or
coercing (with physical or psychological force) another person
to perform an action she would not otherwise perform could not
promote mutual respect.” 36 Similar to Pineau, Estes champions
the idea of reciprocal consent in which each participant in a
sexual activity demonstrates clearly that they are freely choosing to engage in that particular sexual activity at that particular
moment. 37 The first step is to start discussing our likes and
dislikes with our partner before we engage in sexual activity,
which decreases the possibility of miscommunication in the
bedroom. Estes believes that by doing this we have a much
greater chance of understanding our partner’s expressions of
34
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consent and desire. By reading our partner’s reactions, we in
turn have a better chance for sexual fulfillment, “while also
improving our sexual technique and our opportunity for a
repeat performance.” 38
Even though this may be a difficult task when pursuing a
much more casual relationship, Estes believes that it is not
completely impossible to practice communicative sexuality
while hooking up with your Tinder date. Instead, she argues,
“There’s nothing intrinsically morally wrong with casual sexual
interactions, but the participants must be morally responsible
and honest enough to communicate openly and respond
considerately.” 39 As long as we are open and respectful with all
of our sexual partners, no matter how brief our connection,
there is the possibility of responsible, pleasurable, consensual
sex. To emphasize just how important communication with
your partner is, Estes ends her essay by stating:
If you aren't man or woman enough to communicate
about sex and to exert yourself with consenting and
eager partners, then you aren't man or woman enough to
get laid. If you aren't prepared to be a morally conscientious sexual partner, start a vigorous exercise regimen,
become a masturbatory virtuoso, or donate your time to
a good charity, but don't muck up something as important as another person's sexual experience.40
From exploring the opinions of Pineau and Estes, it is clear that
communicative sexuality is the best method for ensuring our
partner’s (and our own) comfort during every sexual encounter.
Seeing as adopting communicative sexuality as the norm would
provide a better sexual experience for both men and women,
how do we then go about promoting this idea so that it becomes
more widely accepted? I believe that an important component
to achieving this would be to improve the quality of sex
38
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education for young people and begin having discussions about
what a healthy sex life means before people become sexually
active.
The next step in becoming more open about sexuality is to
be comfortable talking to our children about how to build a
healthy sexual relationship. Peggy Orenstein discussed this
topic in her NPR interview titled “‘Girls & Sex’ and the
Importance of Talking to Young Women about Pleasure.”
Nowadays, girls hear mixed messages about how to approach
their sexuality – they must not be overtly sexual but at the same
time should always be available for male pleasure. When
Orenstein spoke with teenagers about this topic, one girl even
said, “Usually the opposite of a negative is a positive, but when
you're talking about girls and sex, the opposite of slut is prude,
both of which are negative. So what are you supposed to do?”41
Through the difficulty that girls have with navigating between
both of these damaging terms, Orenstein sees that they are
taught to view sex as a way to please their partners but not
themselves. 42 And this problem starts with how we teach girls
about their sexuality beginning at a young age. Parents of little
girls tend not to even name their daughter’s genitals as they
would with their son, as Orenstein realized, “For boys, they'll
say, ‘Here's your nose, here's your shoulders, here's your waist,
here's your pee pee,’ whatever. But with girls, there's this sort
of blank space — it's right from navel to knees, and not naming
something makes it quite literally unspeakable.” 43
This situation does not seem to improve as girls grow up,
even within an educational setting. As young people begin
puberty and move into middle and high school sex education
classes, teachers address the changes that take place in the male
and female bodies much differently. Girls are taught about their
41
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internal anatomy with charts and diagrams, about periods and
unwanted pregnancies. Boys are taught about erections and the
“emergence of a near-unstoppable sex drive.” 44 Orenstein sees
an issue with this, posing the question, “When do we address
exploration, self-knowledge?” 45 There is no discussion about
what a healthy sex life is or how to communicate sexual desires
with your partner. Many times the only instruction on safe sex
is to abstain from sexual activities all together. This lack of
education doesn’t mean that young people still aren’t curious
about their bodies. Oftentimes, young girls and boys will turn to
pornography to further understand how sexual relationships are
supposed to work when they don’t get enough information from
their teachers or parents. In Orenstein’s New York Times article
“When Did Porn Become Sex Ed?” she says, “According to a
survey of college students in Britain, 60 percent consult
pornography, at least in part, as though it were an instruction
manual, even though nearly three-quarters say that they know it
is as realistic as pro wrestling.” 46 Young adults who have no
real sex education, many armed with abstinence-only teachings
and the instruction of pornography, go to college with no idea
how real sexual relationships are supposed to work and attempt
to navigate their newfound sexual freedom. The lack of a good
sex education, one that includes discussion of communicative
sexuality, leaves rape culture assumptions unchallenged and
perpetuates the negative stereotypes of male and female
sexuality.
Because this lack of sex education is so widespread, especially in America, most college-aged people do not understand
the nuances of discussing desire, pleasure, and consent with
their partner as required in the communicative sexuality model.
This tends to lead to dangerous consequences when hookups on
college campuses often involve dangerous amounts of alcohol.
44
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Although I have determined that it is possible to have casual
sex in combination with a communicative sexuality, the heavy
use of alcohol decreases our ability to be good communicators.
At colleges across the country, alcohol has become the “No. 1
date drug,” as hookups have become increasingly dependent on
the social lubricant.47 Explanations of the dangers of alcohol
are often heavily gendered, which creates further problems. On
the one hand, girls are warned to never leave their drinks
unattended because someone might slip something into their
drink. On the other hand, boys are pressured to drink more to
appear more masculine, oftentimes without being aware of the
possible repercussions. In most instances, alcohol “reduces a
person's ability to read social cues” and reduces inhibitions,
which gives boys the courage to commit assaults they might
otherwise not commit and makes them more aggressive in
general. 48 In addition, alcohol makes boys (and girls) less likely
to intervene as bystanders when they see such aggressive
behaviors. The lack of knowledge about sex in combination
with a lack of understanding about alcohol contributes to the
existence of a non-communicative sexuality that frequently
leads to instances of sexual assault. These issues relating to
college sex show us that we need to be more open as a society
about talking about sex. If we were open about sex earlier, then
it is more likely that, as a whole, we would practice safer sex. It
is a proven fact that the earlier parents, teachers, and doctors
start talking to kids about sex “the more likely they are both to
delay sexual activity and to behave responsibly and ethically
when they do engage in it.” 49 This is what we need if we are
going to expect teenagers or even adults to engage in healthy
sexual relationships.
The legal, moral, and philosophical issues stemming from
sexual assault and consent have deep roots in our societal
perceptions about women and sex. Over the course of this
47
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essay, I have argued that the current legal definitions of consent
do not protect against instances of assault because of the
existence of rape culture, which damages female sexuality,
promotes sexual harassment, and allows for the high rates of
sexual assault that occur each year. The way to fix these issues
would be to adopt the communicative sexuality model. I believe
that if we stopped being afraid to have open and honest
discussions with young people about the benefits of communicative sexuality and pleasure instead of constantly focusing on
the potential negative consequences, men and women could
have healthier sex lives. If we taught boys and girls the same
things about pleasure and consent, everyone would respect the
right to say no to sex just as much as the right to say yes. If we
started these conversations at an early age, to practice communicative sexuality as an adult would become natural. If this
were to become the norm, I believe that cases of sexual assault
would decrease, and instances where it did occur would be
more easily prosecuted and properly punished. Without the
harmful effects of a rape culture that assumes that a victim
“asked for it,” cases of sexual assault would be based on the
idea of ensuring ongoing consent instead of what she was
wearing or how much she resisted. In order to change how the
law handles sexual assault, we need to change how our culture
views sex. In order to change how our culture views sex, we
need to educate young people about the benefits, not just the
risks, of sexual activity.
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ANNE CARSON: SHAPING THE SELF AND
SHIFTING UNDER THE READER’S GAZE
Margaret Shelton

Two bodies outlined on a bed, the eye (“I”) of one rising
up and feeling the distance between conscious choice and
compulsion of the soul. Two desks, one placed at each extremity of the writerly self as its owner fights to define and to escape
definition. Thirteen still images of the self in stop-motion, and
one subject shifting in thirteen frames. Covering such topics as
loss of love and search for self, “The Glass Essay” floats
between essay and poem, borrowing from each genre, liminal
like the space in which poet, scholar, and literary critic Anne
Carson seats the self, edges alternately blurring and sharp like a
shard of glass. In this piece and in interviews, Carson works to
move toward a self that she can understand and accept—one
that she can define. Yet Carson’s drive to create a shared
meaning battles with her joy in being the only one to know all
of the secret selves within her. Carson in literature and in life
prizes both crisp lines and elusiveness, which shows in the
contrast between her precise language and shadowed meanings,
loving the liminal, craving connection as well as the ability to
craft a self purely her own.
Writer and literary critic Vivian Gornick in The Situation
and the Story addresses the presence and necessity of the self in
writing, emphasizing the importance of the stability of the self.
According to Gornick, “the way the narrator—or persona—” or
self “sees things is, to the largest degree, the thing being seen,”
especially in non-fiction writing. 1 Gornick explains that “[t]he
1
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situation is the context or circumstance, sometimes the plot; the
story is the emotional experience that preoccupies the writer:
the insight, the wisdom, the thing one has come to say,” but to
take her claim one step further, to consider what preoccupies
the reader, it is the discovery of self, both the author’s self and
the reader’s, that motivates the reading. 2 The situation is the
background, the story is the fuel for the writer, but as a reader, I
come to non-fiction for connection, a sense that in writing her
story the author has woven into it something of mine, something of me. The setting and the action are essential but
essentially disparate things; the self strings the reader along and
makes the narrative cohesive.
The creation of a self fascinates Gornick, especially when
she thinks in terms of persona, which allows the writer to draw
her own lines around the sections of self that she wants to
present. Gornick’s ideal persona can be defined by, or rather is,
one attribute. She explains after rereading a diary that she had
written earlier:
With relief I thought, I’m not losing myself. Suddenly I
realized there was no myself to lose. I had a narrator on
the page strong enough to do battle for me. The narrator
was the me who could not leave her mother because she
had become her mother. She was not intimidated by
“alone again.” Nor, come to think of it, was she much
influenced by the me who was a walker in the city, or a
divorced middle-aged feminist, or a financially insecure
writer. She was apparently, only her solid, limited self—
and she was in control. 3
The beauty of this self for Gornick is that it allows her to isolate
one element of her personality, of her life, and to communicate
that alone to the reader. The ability to section off the self allows
the author to ensure that the reader sees the written self from a
certain angle because the persona like Gornick’s only presents
2
3
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one angle. In contrast, Anne Carson sees the multiplicities
inside herself and connects to the reader by shattering the self
to see inside and offering the pieces for the reader to put back
together to make something meaningful.
While the self runs through the piece like a thread, stringing together seemingly disparate sections, the complexity of its
weave keeps the self from ever being fully exposed or understood. Rather than showing her self to the reader in neat even
stitches, Carson brings the self to the top of the poetic pattern
only to let it sink again into the background, giving the reader
images of the speaker in the Nudes and letting the self speak
through the words of others like Emily Brontë, but never quite
saying, “Here I am.” Carson examines the self from several
different angles in “The Glass Essay,” but the self that she
illustrates is distanced, fluid, fleeing.
Carson’s ability to situate this fluid self within a clearly
structured form is what makes “The Glass Essay” a complex
study. The piece consists of nine distinct subtitled sections,
each of which comprises several three- or four-lined stanzas.
The sturdiness of this structure allows Carson to establish on
the page a liminal self as well as a written piece seated in the
liminal space where two genres touch—poetry and non-fiction.
As critic Ian Rae points out in his article on Carson’s narrative
technique in the poem, Carson has been criticized by some
American critics as writing “‘chopped prose’ . . . positioning it
as the exemplary case of a hybrid and increasingly prominent
genre, the lyric essay.” 4 Carson published “The Glass Essay” in
her book of poetry Glass, Irony, and God, but she labels it
“essay” from the start. Poetry allows for embellishment, but
essay suggests reality. This straddling of genres prepares the
reader for the vivid, often enigmatic imagery that the idea of
poetry connotes, but it also looks forward to the detail- and
fact-oriented prose through which Carson communicates.
4
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Rae further explores the duality between the studied and
the secret self that runs through Carson’s work, looking
especially at the significance of her title, “The Glass Essay.” He
writes that “Carson employs the logic of the lyric essay to
produce an extended, bilingual pun on the multiple senses of
the English ‘glass’ (transparent material, magnifying lens,
mirror) and the French glace (ice, mirror).” 5 Carson brings into
play the idea of glass as a mirror in the first section of the poem
when she writes, “My face in the bathroom mirror / has white
streaks down it. / I rinse the face and return to bed. / Tomorrow
I am going to visit my mother.” 6 This scene gestures toward
philosopher Jacques Lacan’s work on the Mirror Stage, which
he describes as “an identification . . . namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes [assume] an image”—which, in this case, Carson creates of and for
herself in the poem—and comes to view the individual pieces
of the whole gestalt that is the self.7 This section holds the first
indication of the division between Carson’s selves that reappears throughout the piece in her choice to use a dissociative
article, “the face,” instead of claiming “my face” a second time.
It is when Carson looks into the mirror and confronts her own
image that she starts to view herself from a distance.
Carson speaks about the process of placing these distinct
images next to one another in an interview with Rae for the
Paris Review, explaining that “particular images begin the
thinking or the work. For example, ‘The Glass Essay’ began
with staring at a frozen ditch near my mother’s house, which I
think actually occurs in the poem somewhere. So some phenomenological thing gives rise to the idea.” 8 Rae asserts that
the author’s continued reexaminations of the “phenomenologi5
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cal thing” stack up to form the poem and that “[the] evolving
glass/glace motif thereby serves to cluster percepts, affects, and
memories in a constant state of becoming.” 9 The self acts in the
same way in “The Glass Essay,” evolving and changing,
fracturing further with each section.
Carson narrates the splitting of the self, this “becoming”
during her final encounter with Law, her ex-lover in section
four of the piece, titled “Whacher.” The speaker notes that Law
will not meet her eyes when he tells her that there was “not
enough spin on . . . our five years of love,” and she “[feels her]
heart snap into two pieces / which floated apart.”10 This signals
the initial break in Carson, the duality that she establishes
throughout this section between body and mind, between “soul”
(love’s “necessities”) and “I” (conscious choice). 11 After
removing her clothes, the speaker describes herself not as naked
but as “nude.” 12 The term “nude” here echoes the Nudes, the
metaphorical paintings in terms of which the speaker thinks of
herself. As “nude” is a term used typically to describe art that
Carson here uses in reference to the self, it furthers the point
that the speaker feels that she is in ownership of her body, like
an artist in technical terms owns a painting that she creates, but
that her body is operating outside of her control like a painting
that has meaning not necessarily in connection to the artist but
in itself. When disconnected from the consciousness attached to
it, the speaker’s body, like a painting, betrays her and determines its own meaning.
She becomes a consciousness living in a body that rebels
against her, distinguishing between the two in a pronoun
change, “I turned my back because he likes the back” (emphasis
mine). 13 She possesses the body but is distanced from it; owns
it but does not control it. The body is drawn to “a man who no
9
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longer cherished me” and runs through the empty motions of
something that used to have meaning, but the “I,” the self, is
only unwillingly dragged along:
There was no area of my mind
not appalled by this action, no part of my body
that could have done otherwise. 14
The speaker then complicates further the distinction between
the body and the “I” attached to it when she writes:
But to talk of mind and body begs the question.
Soul is the place,
stretched like a surface of millstone grit between body
and mind,
where such necessity grinds itself out.
Soul is what I kept watch on all that night.15
Not only are “I” and body separating, but the speaker now tries
to separate soul and self-awareness in the form of “I.” The
thinking and rational “I” watches over “soul,” symbolic of love,
in two senses—watching over as in caring for something and
watching over as in guarding against something—seemingly
both to preserve the love with Law that occurred in the soul and
to protect the speaker from feeling it. When Law and the
speaker grow closer, physically and emotionally, the speaker’s
consciousness, the “I,” ejects itself from the body in what
seems an attempt at defending and removing itself from the
potentially destructive emotions of the situation. “I” floats
“high up near the ceiling looking down / on the two souls
clasped there on the bed / with their mortal boundaries [bodies]
/ visible around them like lines on a map.” 16 While the speaker
stays through the souls’ division, “I” takes itself away.
Carson’s syntax and diction in this section reinforce this
idea of a flight from emotion. When describing the develop14
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ment of the encounter with Law, Carson uses heavily descriptive and figurative language, describing the night as “a night
that centred Heaven and Hell,” “as if it weren’t really a night of
sleep and time.” 17 The religious language of Heaven and Hell
gives the impression that the two of them—the speaker and
Law—are in the middle of their own private apocalypse, a final
coming together and a final falling away with their universes
swirling around them. The night is suspended outside of time,
spanning forever and an instant, but the speaker is also out of
time in the sense that she feels her relationship with Law
expiring, its final minutes ticking away. Yet after “I” rises up,
rises away from body and soul, separating consciousness from
carnal impulse, after Law and the speaker become just “two
souls clasped there on the bed,” caged in by two bodies,
Carson’s language becomes more factual and terse:
I saw the lines harden.
He left in the morning.
It is very cold
walking into the long scraped April wind.
At this time of year there is no sunset
just some movements inside the light and then a sinking
away. 18
For the speaker, this final interaction with Law is like the
sunset; it lacks closure. There is no finality to their relationship,
just one shared night and the slow sink of two “I’s” back into
body and soul, away from each other and into their separate
selves. The lines that divide Law and the speaker harden.
In an interview with John D’Agata, Carson addresses this
blurring and redrawing of lines: “I just remember writing in
second grade every Friday afternoon. It was such a pleasure.
We’d draw a picture then write on it and tell what it was.” 19
17

Ibid.
Ibid.
19 John D’Agata and Anne Carson, “A ______ with Anne Carson,” The Iowa Review 27, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 1997): 9.
18

85

Furman Humanities Review

When D’Agata asks, “Why was that pleasurable?” Carson
responds, “How could it not be pleasurable?” 20 Even as a child
in grade school, Carson enjoyed condensing entities into
images into the written word, illustration, and description
working both to share and to shroud. Carson shows her love of
translating lines into letters in her final images of “The Glass
Essay” and explores the division within the self in the sections
of “The Glass Essay” entitled “Liberty” and “Thou” when she
describes herself as a set of paintings—Nudes No. 1 through
No. 13. The speaker explains that these Nudes came to her
when she meditated in the mornings as “nude glimpse[s] of my
lone soul,” the same self in thirteen iterations, from thirteen
angles, shifting and fracturing like light through glass. 21 She
writes that the nudes are “as clear in my mind / as pieces of
laundry that froze on the clothesline overnight.” 22 Frozen
suggests ice, which suggests fragility. Though these Nudes are
the clothing in which the speaker dresses herself, the images are
not enduring; they capture the self in one instant and are apt to
shatter in the next, like ice, like glass.
These images act as crystals, freezing a moment of herself
so that she can turn it around in her mind and use it as a lens
through which to look out at her life. When the speaker tells her
therapist about the Nudes, her therapist asks her, “When you
see these horrible images why do you stay with them? . . .
Why not go away?” the speaker responds, “I was amazed. / Go
away where? I said.” 23 Her response suggests that to escape the
Nudes, the variations of self that manifest to her, would be
impossible. Not only do these Nudes contain something of her;
they are contained in her. These nude portraits are on display in
the gallery of her body: “Woman caught in a cage of thorns . . .
unable to stand upright,” “woman with a single great thorn
implanted in her forehead . . . endeavouring to wrench it out,”
20
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“woman on a blasted landscape / backlit in red like Hieronymous Bosch.” 24 She is aware that they are not her but pictures
of her. Yet to quote David Shields, quoting Orson Welles,
quoting Elmyr de Hory, whose quote is so far removed from its
author that it has taken on an existence independent of him, “If
my forgeries are hung long enough in the museum, they
become real.” 25
Foucault muses over this disconnect between the object
pictured and the picture-object itself in René Magritte’s
painting “The Treachery of Images,” in which Magritte places
the painted image of a pipe above the words, written in “a
steady, painstaking, artificial script,” “Ceci n’est pas une
pipe”—this is not a pipe. Foucault also discusses a second
iteration of the image, in which Magritte depicts the original
painting “set within a frame” on an easel on a floor, above
which floats “a pipe exactly like the one in the picture, but
much larger.” 26 Foucault muses over the piece, wondering if it
is more accurate to say that there are “two pipes” or “two
drawings of the same pipe.” 27 The reader can ask the same
question of Carson’s nudes. They are separate paintings; no two
images are the same. Yet while none of the nudes are identical,
they represent the same subject and attempt to convey the same
idea in different scenes—the same self from different angles.
Foucault explains that while the individual elements of the
picture are identifiable as pipe, easel, floor, the piece lacks the
cohesion necessary to convey a clear meaning. The larger,
unframed pipe “lacks coordinates” and floats suspended in
space, and the easel’s legs are uneven, foretelling collapse.28
Both artists paint their images with a specificity of detail that
24
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suggests that they know the secret meaning. Yet Carson, like
Magritte, presents the viewers with the materials that make up
the art but disguise the process, leaving the discovery of means
and the creation of meaning to the reader.
Carson calls back to these artistic elements of “The Glass
Essay” in a later interview for The Paris Review with fellow
writer Will Aitken, elucidating her choice to incorporate the
Nudes as a sort of mock-ekphrastic exercise, writing them as
paintings and not simply incorporating them into the poem as
frameless images:
[Aitken:] “There’s too much self in my writing.” Is the
range of work that you do—poetry, essays, opera, academic work, teaching—is that a way of trying to punch
windows in the walls of the self?
[Carson:] No. I would say it’s more like a way to avoid
having a self by moving from one definition of it to
another. To avoid being captured in one persona by
doing a lot of different things. 29
This quote suggests a possible reading that she approached each
Nude as a potential angle for the self but intended that the
combination would lack the coherence necessary to allow the
self to be pinned down. Carson remarks at one point during the
interview that one of her books “is like architecture because the
poem, the original ancient poem which does exist, is in the
center.” 30 Similarly, the core of the speaker in “The Glass
Essay,” that self, exists at the center of the poem; the reader can
feel the words winding around her. Carson goes on to say
though that there was “no adequate representation of it I could
give, so I made up all these angles for it . . . so there are ways
of moving into and out of a room from other rooms in the
building, but really what I want to show is glimpses of that
29
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main room in the center.” 31 Carson moves the reader through
the house of herself, offering views through keyholes and
cracks in the wall, but she never opens the door for the reader to
see her self in its entirety. If this is the case, the essential
quality of the self that Carson presents in the poem is its desire
to understand itself but to remain undefined.
Carson elaborates on this struggle between selfdetermination and disguise in her interview with D’Agata in a
discussion of the two writing desks in her home. D’Agata
explains that he understands Carson to have two separate
writing desks, one for writing poetry and one for academic
writing. Carson confirms the assertion. She then comments that
after she wrote Eros the Bittersweet, which D’Agata described
as both a critical examination of and a lyrical meditation on
Sappho’s writings, “It was possibly the last time that I got those
two impulses to move in the same stream—the academic and
the other. After that, I think I realized I couldn’t do it again.” 32
D’Agata then argues with Carson, trying to convince her that
“some people would say you’re still doing it . . . [t]hat there’s
no suggestion of two desks at work,” but Carson refuses to let
herself be pinned down or outlined by others. 33 The two desk
method seems a way of splitting, not only her written self but
her writing self, into the Carson who writes academically and
the Carson who writes (and is) “other.” “No,” she says. “No?”
he asks. Silence. 34 She knows the answer. She knows herself.
She eludes.
Carson translates the desire for an elusive literary self into
the self that inhabits her physical body through an expression of
gender fluidity. According to gender theorist Judith Butler,
“Gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted
in an exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts” which
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“constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self.”35 For
Butler, gender is self-determined. It is “stylized,” something
performed and constructed by each individual and not tied to
the body that the individual inhabits. In the interview with
Aitken, Carson’s speech parallels Butler’s idea of gender as
performance and illusion, saying, “I guess I’ve never felt
entirely female, but then probably lots of people don’t. But I
think that at different times in my life I located myself in
different places on the gender spectrum.” 36 Her active voice
attests to the elective aspect of Carson’s gender. She does not
say, “I’ve found myself in different places,” or even “I’ve been
in different places,” but “I have located myself in different
places.”
Carson also varies the way in which she performs gender,
just as she varies the literary genres in which she writes,
conscious that while she works toward self-expression, she
must also work against the literary and social constructs that
would confine her to a certain definition of genre or gender.
Speaking to her desire to live in a liminal gender space, or a
space altogether un-gendered, Carson equates her experience to
“a problem of extended adolescence: You don’t know how to
be yourself as part of a category, so you just have to be yourself
as a completely strange individual and fight off any attempt
others make to define you.” 37 Carson struggles to make what
society would have marked as a phase in adolescence into a
place in which she can fully inhabit herself; rather than assimilate society’s truth she can create her own.
Or she can let her own truth radiate out from within her.
The last nude in her series of self-iterations, “Nude #13 arrived
when I was not watching for it”—”a human body / trying to
stand” against winds that tear away the flesh, “cleansing the
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bone,” “and there was no pain.”38 Speaker and I and the outside
world write and whittle away at an idea of the self, and then
Carson steps out from the midst of them. In the image of the
13th Nude, Carson is the source of speaker; she is the “I” and
the words and the wind “so terrible that the flesh was blowing
away from the bone.” 39 The craft and the chaos of Nudes and
selves clings as dust to the heels of her feet, and then Carson is
the pillar of bone, “[standing] forth silver and necessary.” 40
Maintaining eye contact, she blows away the dust.
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A BETTER PASTURE:
EXCELLENT SHEEP, AMOUR-PROPRE,
AND THE SEARCH FOR HAPPINESS
Nathan Thompson

“It is a hundred times easier to be happy than to
appear to be happy.”
-Jean Jacques Rousseau
“Of course I’m miserable, but were I not miserable,
I wouldn’t be at Yale.”
-William Deresiewicz

A double major, a sport, a musical instrument, a couple of
foreign languages, service work in distant corners of the globe,
and, of course, a few hobbies thrown in for good measure, each
mastered with effortlessness and a serene self-assurance. This is
the stuff of 21st-century super-achievers, those students at elite
schools who appear cheerfully competent at everything. If that
sounds anything like you, your friends, or what you aspire to
be, this paper is for you. If the names Deerfield, Williams,
Harvard, or Stanford mean anything to you, this paper is for
you. Most importantly, if you’re tired of running laps on the
well-worn treadmill of success, this paper is for you.
In his Excellent Sheep: The Miseducation of the American
Elite and the Way to a Meaningful Life, William Deresiewicz
unapologetically exposes the aspirations and deep-rooted
anxieties of the “best and brightest” filing into the top universities in the United States. He introduces the reader to the
formidable combination of brains, ambition, and fear of failure
residing in many young people and their families. These
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students’ capacity to consume, analyze, and regurgitate
information is breathtaking, be it every member of a class
memorizing and reciting 100 lines of Shakespeare without a
single error or a high school student conducting cancer research. Assign them a school task, and it will be completed
with ruthless efficiency. Every “i” will be dotted. Every “t” will
be crossed. Curiously, however, closer examination reveals so
many similarities between these high achievers that their
individual identities appear stripped away. One might even go
so far as to call them sheep. Of course, they are not average
sheep—they roam around together, eating AP courses for
breakfast, spending summers working prestigious internships,
and traveling the world for cultural enrichment. They are
excellent.
These kinds of students, however, are no longer simply the
product of the meritocracy for which America is famed. They
do not come from just anywhere, nor do they embody timehonored American examples of how hard work, long hours, and
a little bit of luck can take children of poverty and turn them
into something exceptional. Quite the opposite. In the clear,
compelling, and frightening three hundred pages of his Coming
Apart: The State of White America 1960-2010, Charles Murray
demonstrates that, for the first time, America is seeing both the
drawing and hardening of class lines: a real upper class, a real
lower class, and everyone in the middle moving in one direction or the other. 1 However, this divergence is not only a
monetary one. It is also one of values, habits, education, and
geographic location—and make no mistake: while a few
stragglers are welcomed into the fold, Deresiewicz’s sheep are
the children of this new upper class.
These excellent sheep, populating the Ivies (or their neighbors who rank highly in U.S. News and World Report) and
prestigious financial and consulting institutions after graduation, are the product of several important inputs: top-flight
1
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education, high family income, stability at home, parents with
advanced degrees, and geographic isolation from those not
sharing similar characteristics. Together, these factors have
begun limiting the capacity of traditional American meritocracy
to generate social and economic mobility. These students are
exceptionally competent, analytical, intelligent, and hardworking, but it would be dishonest to say that their smarts are
the sole cause of their material success in life. Success nowadays is primarily, if not exclusively, the result of a system. It is
a system caught somewhere between being hereditary and
meritocratic—generally speaking, circumstances of birth are
important but may not be enough to succeed anymore without
the brains to match and vice versa—and its products are
peerless. It is a system Deresiewicz describes as the laundering
of privilege. 2
Despite this system’s effectiveness, the excellence it produces comes at costs much greater than a few missed parties
and a handful of all-nighters. These costs are perhaps known
and felt in the deepest corners of the heart and mind but go
otherwise unarticulated: insecurity, fear of failure, a deeprooted unhappiness, and the atrophy of the soul. Recognizing
such costs might reasonably lead one to challenge and look for
alternatives to an excellent sheep’s notion of success, and
because these potential costs are too great to ignore, the
remainder of the paper will attempt to give them proper
attention.
In order to understand these creatures of success, it is first
necessary to explore the origin of their excellence. As
Deresiewicz and others observe, one does not have to look long
or far to see what creates this crop of high achievers. It begins
in the home, where a suffocating amount of pressure is applied
to achieve success from a young age. It does not even have to
be intentional. But as Deresiewicz writes, the business of
2
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“determining the exact hierarchy of status within the upper
middle class itself” is a serious one, and most, if not all, of a
family’s resources tend to be directed towards building the
pressure cooker that will spit out diamonds bearing Ivy League
credentials. 3
The lesson is learned from an early age that in life “there is
no middle ground; if you’re not the best, you’re a ‘loser.’ If
you’re not brilliant, you’re worthless.”4 Students may find
themselves identifying with the pressures that Deresiewicz
claims converge at home: “status competition within extended
families; peer pressure within communities; the desire to
measure up to your own parents, or to best them.” 5 The list of
achievements attained by kids trying to relieve those pressures
include the usual suspects of a perfect GPA, president of a club,
captain of a team, or first chair in the orchestra, but in the end,
each is simply a tool with which to measure outperforming
one’s peers.
As one might imagine, family relationships based on the
expectation of a child excelling above and beyond his or her
peers, even if unspoken, easily become conditional. Deresiewicz writes that what is “expected by many parents in
affluent communities is not a personal best but the absolute
best,” so even if all little Johnny can manage in his 10th grade
English class is a B+, that will not cut it at home. 6 Ultimately,
the “production of measurable virtue in children” is the goal
towards which Mom and Dad direct life. As Deresiewicz aptly
notes, though, measureable here means “capable of showing up
on a college application.” 7 Spending time “hanging out” or
hiking local trails on the weekend are not items that frequent
most resumes; learning a second language or tutoring underresourced kids are.
3
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Given the enormous expectations faced by students to be
the very best, it is no wonder that their identities are found in
“measurable” achievement. However, such identity is not only
given to Deresiewicz’s sheep. They also consume, perpetuate,
and preach it. The currency of this identity is Ivy League
acceptances, perfect SAT scores, and Instagram photos from
exotic trips. These are the symbols of status and accomplishment one can quietly slip into conversation with just enough of
an “aw, shucks” attitude to draw the verbal affirmation of one’s
peers while, one hopes, also making them jealous.
A deep, addictive satisfaction comes from such recognition. If one possesses enough of this currency, one becomes
entitled to his or her peers’ praise. And these excellent sheep
will do just about anything to strike it rich—or avoid coming up
empty. The purpose of life “becomes the accumulation of gold
stars,” and what constitutes a valid life becomes “affluence,
credentials, and prestige” rather than pursuing one’s passions.8
Professions that do not ultimately land six-figure salaries and
luxurious homes are not worth our time. Credentials that are not
instantaneously recognizable are without value. The pursuit of
meaning beyond a strong resume is nonsensical. Deresiewicz
imagines those deep-seated concerns with failure in the form of
a series of potent questions:
How can I become a teacher, or a minister, or a carpenter? Wouldn’t that be a waste of my fancy education?
What would my parents think? What would my friends
think? How would I face my classmates at our twentieth
reunion, when they’re all rich doctors or important people in New York? And the question that exists behind
them all: isn’t it beneath me? 9
These questions strike at the heart of the matter: everyone
is afraid of failing in front of parents and peers, showing any
sign of weakness, or having to show up at the reunion as a
8
9
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non-profit worker because neither McKinsey nor Bain nor
Goldman ever came calling. As a result, one must be able to do
everything and do everything well. The cost of falling short in
this respect becomes “not merely practical, but existential.”10
To not ultimately land at an Ivy League or one of its neighbors
on the way to a successful career in finance, consulting, law, or
medicine is the same as being worthless. And so we develop all
the necessary abilities for this kind of life—not how to think
but rather those “analytical and rhetorical skills that are
necessary for success in business and the professions.” 11
Ross Douthat memorably relates from his four years at
Harvard how he was taught to get away with doing as little as
possible. For him it was hard work to “get into Harvard,” to
compete for “offices and honors with thousands of brilliant and
driven young people,” and to fight for “law school slots and Ibanking jobs as college wound to a close.” 12 The academics,
though, were not hard work. They were “the easy part.” 13 As a
result, it was a rare sheep indeed that invested more time in true
learning than in making connections or crafting the perfect
resume. Deresiewicz is no kinder, suggesting that what “Ivy
League-caliber schools like Yale or Columbia teach their
students is how to pretend, and how to do it well.”14 Ultimately,
we build an identity around accomplishments that can pad a
resume, and we hope those resumes are strong enough to shore
up our self-esteem in the event of a calamitous development
such as criticism or failure.
Interestingly, the question why? is rarely asked—why it
matters so much that our SAT scores clear 1500 instead of
1400, why our BA must come from Princeton instead of
Rutgers, or why our first job has to be with J.P Morgan instead
10

Ibid., 22.
Ibid., 63.
12
Ross Douthat, Privilege: Harvard the Education of the Ruling Class (New York: Hyperion, 2005), 140.
13 Ibid., 140.
14
Deresiewicz, Excellent Sheep, 104.
11

98

Nathan Thompson

of a non-profit. Dwight Macdonald once remarked upon the
great curiosity that “we think it odd that a man should devote
his life to writing poems . . . but natural that he should devote it
to inducing children to breakfast on Crunchies instead of
Krispies.” 15 There is a depressing humor in Macdonald’s
observation, for who on the path to hard-earned success would
not recognize a well-paid marketing position with Kellogg as a
post more enviable than that of a high school English teacher?
Furthermore, there is a premise underlying this notion of
success that is similarly left in the shadows: that “what makes
for a happy life and a good society [is] simply self-evident, . . .
as if in either case the exclusive answer [is] more money.” 16 It
is a premise, though, that is accepted by a majority of students.
In 1971, only 37% of incoming college freshmen said it was
essential or very important to be “very well-off financially”
compared to 73% who said it was similarly important to
“develop a meaningful philosophy of life.” 17 In 2011, “the
numbers were almost reversed,” with 80% believing that being
very well off is essential versus only 47% emphasizing the
importance of developing a meaningful philosophy of life. 18
However, even those who achieve their goal of success, as
has already been noted, do not do so without cost. In fact, there
is a great deal of research and anecdotal evidence pointing to a
deep-seated unhappiness within the hearts and minds of the
high achievers among us. Deresiewicz writes that preteens and
teens from affluent and well-educated families experience
“among the highest rates of depression, substance abuse,
anxiety disorders, somatic complaints, and unhappiness of any
group of children” in the United States, with “as many as 22
percent of adolescent girls from financially comfortable
families” suffering from clinical depression. 19
15
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The disastrous effects of the pressure placed on teens in
upper-middle class homes is heartbreakingly documented by
Madeline Levine in her New York Times Bestseller, The Price
of Privilege. Her stories are similar and numerous, covering a
host of problems from drug abuse to binge drinking to anxiety
and depression to anorexia. Levine writes that “as many as 30
to 40 percent of twelve- to eighteen-year olds from affluent
homes are experiencing troubling psychological symptoms,”
which do nothing to lower the frequency of harmful behaviors
and the intensity of the pressure to succeed that is felt. 20 The
backdrop to each of her stories of young men and women
abusing drugs and alcohol, cutting, contemplating suicide, and
reporting remarkable unhappiness is almost universally a
combination of a crushing pressure to succeed, a crippling fear
of failure, and a misguided belief that pressing on might
somehow lead to happiness. These are the stories of excellent
sheep, and they are a wakeup call to those of us who either
tacitly or expressly endorse an environment of high-pressure
perfectionism.
When coupled with a deep unhappiness, this constant pursuit of “success” is exhausting. And yet, we continue to trap
ourselves in this vicious cycle. The pursuit of status, success,
and high achievement at the cost of sleep, relationships, true
learning, and even happiness becomes a race with no finish
line. So why do we keep running? Simply stated, we are slaves
to the opinions of others. Students are “trained to depend” upon
the “drug of praise.” 21 We become presidents of clubs, captains
of teams, and students with perfect GPAs and SAT scores not
because we genuinely enjoy them but because those are the
things that ensure we will receive the most praise. These
symbols of achievement “signify not just your fate, but your
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identity; not just your identity, but your value. They are who
you are, and what you’re worth.” 22
Self-worth becomes comparative in nature. If we don’t
score as well as other students on standardized tests, attend the
same elite schools as our peers, or land the same prestigious
jobs after graduation, we must suffer the low opinion of our
parents, our friends, and our professors—an unacceptable
prospect. The problem with self-worth based on a relative
sentiment like opinion is that it engenders a severe internal
uncertainty and instability. Under such circumstances, there can
be little confidence of place or of one’s own value as an
individual. In turn, such uncertainty demands the herculean
efforts exhibited by those excellent sheep climbing ever higher
on the ladder of success.
Unfortunately for those sheep, though, there is no rooftop
to reach, so the climbing never ends. When chasing after status
and the high regard of others, one finds very quickly that
“status doesn’t get you much except the knowledge that you
have it.” Given its endless nature, this pursuit “doesn’t just not
make you happy: it makes you actively unhappy” precisely
because it is “comparative, and competitive, by its very nature.”
Deresiewicz shares the sorry experience of those students who
get to places like Yale thinking they’ve arrived, “only to
discover that there are still other places to arrive at” and that
there always will be. Clearly, contentment and the pursuit of
status do not mix. 23
It should come as no surprise that a life spent running a
race that has no finish line would be both exhausting and
deeply unsatisfying, yet it would appear that many of us remain
committed to the enterprise of chasing down success. This
commitment is inextricably linked to a conception of self-love
that is comparative. Our worth is bolstered when we compare
ourselves to others and find that we are achieving just as much
as or more than our peers, that we have at least the same or,
22
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better yet, higher GPAs than our fellow students, or that we got
the internship commensurate to our elite education.
This is a picture that many of us might recognize within
ourselves. It is this kind of self love—a relative, comparative,
and dangerous sentiment—that deserves further exploration, for
to comprehend our unwavering commitments to success and
status first requires an understanding of our own yardstick of
self-worth. The comparative nature of our self-love is not
unique to 21st-century high-achievers; it has long been the
companion of humankind. Because this is the case, wisdom
would demand that we examine what those who came before us
have thought and written about our tendency to compare.
When one explores the works of the world’s great thinkers,
it does not take long to realize that many have identified and
analyzed this very issue. Of all those who have written about it,
though, there is one that stands out. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, an
18th-century political philosopher, presents an articulation and
analysis of amour-propre, or vanity—our tendency to value
ourselves based on how we compare to those around us—that is
unrivaled in its clarity, frankness, and forcefulness of argument.
To read Rousseau is to view the human soul with an X-ray.
He exposes, as only he can, the many masks of benevolence,
humility, and selflessness we wear to cover the ambition, ill
will towards others, and selfishness we harbor. However, what
makes Rousseau’s analysis of the problem of comparative selflove the best of its kind (and so helpful for our excellent sheep)
is that he traces its development from cradle to full-fledged
adulthood. According to Rousseau, we are not born as hateful,
vain, or callous individuals but rather as people who learn to be
just so. To more fully understand the quandary of Deresiewicz’s excellent sheep, joining Rousseau at man’s beginning
is a helpful place to start, before tracing the progression to the
final product—namely, an individual who bases his or her value
on the opinions and judgments of others.
For Rousseau, natural man begins as a blank slate, removed from any and all “artificial faculties he could only have
acquired by prolonged progress,” such as language, tools,
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buildings, or farming. 24 In this state, Rousseau finds a man
“sating his hunger beneath an oak, slaking his thirst at the first
stream, finding his bed at the foot of the same tree that supplied
his meal, and with that his needs are satisfied.” 25 This is a
person in simplest form, needing nothing more than food,
water, and shelter. When deprived of every sort of enlightenment, the only goods known to natural man are “food, a female,
and rest,” and natural man does not even possess the
“knowledge of death and its terrors.”26 In fact, so blind is
natural man to anything past the present that “his projects, as
limited as his views, hardly extend to the close of day.” 27
Part of the utter simplicity of natural man is tied to a desire
for self-preservation. Rousseau writes that man’s “first care”
was “that for his preservation,” a driving force that leads a
person to seek only the most basic needs.28 This kind of desire
is described by Rousseau as “self-love—a primitive, innate
passion, which is anterior to every other.” 29 It is not hateful or
desiring of the approval of others. To Rousseau, “self-love,
which regards only ourselves, is contented when our true needs
are satisfied.” 30
However, the trouble begins when we leave a solitary life
and interact with other human beings. By virtue of seeing
another person, one observes the differences that exist between
one’s self and the other. In fact, Rousseau argues that the very
act of thinking—something unique to the human race—requires
24 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Discourse on the Origin and Foun-
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that we make distinctions and identify what makes each object
and person unique. For instance, Rousseau challenges his
reader to try and outline the image of a tree without specifics
but goes on to argue that such a task is impossible. He writes
that “in spite of yourself, [the tree] will have to be seen as small
or large, bare or leafy, light or dark . . . you cannot help making
its lines perceptible or its surface colored.” 31 It is impossible to
see things generally—we view the world in specifics. Ultimately, thinking amounts to distinguishing between various objects
and ideas, so when one person comes in contact with another,
specific comparison is inevitable.
As Rousseau states, “The first glance [man] casts on his
fellows leads him to compare himself with them.” 32 Even if no
malevolence is intended, we gauge who is taller, who is faster,
or who is stronger. Rousseau notes that “the relations which we
express by the words great, small, strong, weak, fast, slow,
fearful, bold, and other such ideas, compared as need required
and almost without thinking about it, finally produced in him
some sort of reflection, or rather a mechanical prudence that
suggested to him the precautions most necessary for his
safety.” 33
It is not long, though, before elementary comparisons develop into a habit of comparing more than height, speed, or
strength. Rousseau notes that while man was “scarcely able to
discriminate ranks, . . . he was from afar preparing to claim first
rank as an individual.” 34 From this first point of comparison,
the long fall from innocence begins. Rousseau’s description is
worth quoting at length:
Everyone began to look at everyone else and to wish to
be looked at himself, and public esteem acquired a price.
The one who sang or danced best; the handsomest, the
31
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strongest, the most skillful, or the most eloquent came to
be the most highly regarded, and this was the first step
at once toward inequality and vice: from these first preferences arose vanity and contempt on the one hand,
shame and envy on the other; and the fermentation
caused by these new leavens eventually produced compounds fatal to happiness and innocence.35
Thus is born amour-propre, or vanity. It is “a relative sentiment, factitious, and born in society, which inclines every
individual to set greater store by himself than by anyone
else.” 36 Not only that, it also “demands others to prefer us to
themselves, which is impossible.”37 For Rousseau, it is inescapable. It is not just that we became vain and envious, though.
Amour-propre, a sentiment of vanity and comparison, has a
distinct character, one of “consuming ambition” that “instills in
all men a black inclination to harm one another, a secret
jealousy that is all the more dangerous as it often assumes the
mask of benevolence in order to strike its blow in greater
safety.” 38
Rousseau’s analysis clearly identifies what the mental processes behind amour-propre actually are. After all, how often
do we wear masks of benevolence in order to ensure that we are
ultimately viewed as better than our peers? How often do we
feign humility or generosity or kindness simply for the sake of
being thought of as humble, generous, or kind? How many
times have we cared far more about how others viewed us than
about the morality or character of our actions? Not as immediately clear, though, are the consequences of this kind of selflove, and this is where Rousseau’s articulation of the deepest
impact of amour-propre is so compelling.
35
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The nature of amour-propre is such that it takes an individual content with a simple life and teaches him or her to
depend upon the opinion of others for value and meaning. The
effect is one of deep unhappiness because a self-love based
upon comparisons made with others is never assured of stability
or fulfillment. In other words, we can always find something
with which to compare ourselves and in which to find ourselves
lacking.
Rousseau relates the story of a young man, who, seeing
another young man “better dressed than himself,” secretly
complains “about his parents’ avarice.”39 However, if this same
young man finds himself “more adorned than another,” he is
“pained to see this other outshine him by birth or wit, and to see
all his gilding humiliated in the presence of a simple cloth
suit.” 40 If nothing else, Rousseau teaches us that there are
innumerable ways to find one’s self inferior to others and that
this leads to a profound unhappiness. Much like the young
people Deresiewicz and Levine describe as suffering from
tremendous pressure to succeed (and the resulting assortment of
consequences), Rousseau’s young man is an example of the
deep insecurity and unhappiness resulting from dependence on
a feeling of relative success among one’s peers.
Of course, there is an assumption necessarily made preceding an individual’s dependence on his or her standing in the
eyes of others, which is that status, praise, and money are
actually valuable in and of themselves. Rousseau writes that “in
order to see the purpose of so many cares . . . power and
reputation would have to have some sort of meaning in [a
man’s] mind.” There is a critical lesson learned, namely that
“there is a sort of men who count how they are looked upon by
the rest of the universe for something, who can be happy and
satisfied with themselves on the testimony of others rather than
on their own.” 41
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There is much of ourselves to be recognized in these 18thcentury writings—a frantic habit of comparison, of looking in
the mirror to ensure everything appears just right, of assigning
great weight to unquantifiable concepts of status or reputation—and Rousseau forcefully accounts for how we arrive at
such a position. From that first glance at another human being
right up to the birth of that dark inclination to see harm done to
those around us, the path is well worn. But if in fact the
tendency to compare to others to the point of exhaustion and
unhappiness is not just a tendency but also an intractable
plague, is there anything to be done?
Reading Rousseau’s assessment of our character is both a
powerful and—if one takes his claims about human nature
seriously—disconcerting experience. His analysis unceremoniously strips away our masks of benevolence and sincerity,
revealing the jealousy, unsympathizing ambition, and paralyzing fear that we seek to hide. But does it do us any good only to
know that day in and day out, we ask others to value us above
themselves? That the recognition and status we inevitably
pursue only makes us vain and insecure people? That the
moment we meet others, we begin making comparisons that can
only end in enmity? While recognizing a problem can be a
helpful step, to end on such a note given the reality of amourpropre does little to address Rousseau’s predicament or offer
solace to Deresiewicz’s sheep. Thus, an exploration of
Rousseau’s conception of a life without amour-propre—a life
of true happiness—becomes necessary.
Rousseau claims that “it is a hundred times easier to be
happy than to appear to be happy,” and this serves as an
outstanding introduction to his notion of happiness.42 This
thought demands that we ask ourselves a question, and it is one
that Deresiewicz is quick to point out that many high achieving
college students either do not know or are too afraid to ask.
This question, surprising as it may be, is not “what will make
me the most successful in life?” or “what will earn me the most
42
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money in life?” Instead the question is “what makes me
happy?” As much of a cliché as it is, this remains an important
question for a society that so readily surrenders its happiness
and self-worth to the opinions of other people. Rousseau’s
insight calls for reflection on what we are doing to appear
happy to others and what we might change so that we are
actually happy.
Rousseau’s answer to this question, perhaps not surprisingly, has little to do with obtaining an Ivy League degree,
working for a prestigious consulting firm, or owning a nice
house. In fact, it begins with simplicity, a virtue with which
many at the top of the food chain may be unfamiliar. This
becomes clear in a number of his writings, particularly his
“Second Discourse,” “Book IV” of Emile, and his Reveries of
the Solitary Walker. Rousseau describes the experience of a
wealthy man who owns a palace but finds no use for all the
rooms because he cannot occupy each one. In the end, it
becomes a gilded cage, promising luxury but delivering an
experience of imprisonment.43 The great flaw of amourpropre’s relative nature is that it spurs the accumulation of
excess (money, clothes, land, titles, reputation), which only
gives people more and more ways to compare what they do or
do not possess. As Rousseau writes, “Sociable man, always
outside himself, is capable of living only in the opinion of
others and, so to speak, derives the sentiment of his own
existence solely from their judgment.” 44 To Rousseau, the first
and proper response to the comparative tendencies of amourpropre is to make an effort to return to simplicity.
An example of what this kind of simplicity looks like for
Rousseau is captured in his Fifth Walk of the Solitary Walker,
during which he describes his days spent on a nearly deserted
island in the middle of a Swiss lake. This sort of abandonment
of society may strike the modern observer as decidedly odd.
After all, Rousseau does not have an iPhone or laptop on his
43
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person, so there will be no way to share with others what he
sees; he has only his memory to capture everything around him.
The scene before Rousseau is one where “there is more natural
greenery, more meadows, grove-shaded retreats, more frequent
contrasts, and more variety in the terrain” than on the mainland. 45 Life on the island forbids “any kind of communication
with the mainland so that being unaware of all that went on in
the world I might forget its existence and that it might also
forget mine.” 46 On Rousseau’s island, no filtered (or #nofilter)
Instagram posts reach the rest of society. No Facebook statuses
describing the “incredible” or “awesome” or “breathtaking”
sights of this island reach the newsfeeds of others, and none of
their communications reach Rousseau. Pleasure is taken from
nothing other than a short walk. Hours are spent observing the
beauty of a single flower. Reward is drawn from an afternoon
paddling around the lake.
Another aspect of this simplicity is its decided lack of orientation towards a set of tasks or goals. Rousseau’s days are
spent “without having any well-determined or constant object,”
a concept that also might fail to compute for a 21st-century
achiever. 47 Somehow, though, this kind of simplicity is what
brings Rousseau the most happiness, and he calls these aimless
days “a hundred times preferable to the sweetest things I had
found in what are called the pleasures of life.” 48
Simplicity is only the beginning of happiness for
Rousseau, though, because the value of a simple life rests on
the bedrock of a more important idea, that true contentment is
found in the sentiment of one’s existence—that the fact of
being alive is enough for one to always be satisfied with life.
One may argue that it is impossible to live a contented and
45
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fulfilled life by merely appreciating one’s existence, but
Rousseau makes a compelling case that demands a serious
response.
In his Reveries of the Solitary Walker, Rousseau describes
the experience of awakening to how unnecessarily he was
weighed down by the opinions of others. He first believed
others viewed him as “the horror of the human race,” observing
that “the only greeting passersby would give [him] would be to
spit” on him. 49 This caused great agitation, indignation, and a
tendency to struggle “without cleverness, without craft . . .
without prudence.” 50 However, after realizing that such innerconflict only ever resulted in an endless struggle over what
cannot be controlled (the opinions of others), he took the only
remaining course, namely “submitting to [his] fate without
railing against necessity any longer.” 51 Rousseau recognized
how much stock he set by the expectations and opinions of
others and, understanding he could not control either one,
finally decided to refrain from assigning them value. No longer
chained to what others think or say about him, Rousseau is able
to find ultimate meaning and value in his own life.
For Rousseau, the sentiment of existence possesses beauty
and mystery. In his Fifth Walk, he says it is a sentiment
“stripped of any other emotion, is in itself a precious sentiment
of contentment and of peace which alone would suffice to make
this existence dear and sweet to anyone able to spurn all the
sensual and earthly impressions which incessantly come to
distract us from it and to trouble its sweetness here-below.” 52
The appeal of the argument for a happiness not derived from
earthly pleasures and the comparisons it leads us to make is that
it is dependent on no person other than one’s self. It is not by
God’s help that we become truly content. It is not by the help of
our neighbor. Rather, we become “like God,” Rousseau claims,
49
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when we are content in our own environment and with our own
existence; by remaining in this state, “we are sufficient unto
ourselves.” 53
One can contest Rousseau’s claim of the ultimate source of
this contentment, but his articulation of the truest expression of
happiness is compelling for two reasons. First, it speaks to a
longing for freedom from the social upkeep to which many feel
chained, and second, there is a profound appeal found in a life
committed to simplicity. In the end, Rousseau’s solution for a
vain and comparing people is to attack the problem of amourpropre at its source: the more simply we live, the fewer points
of reference we have with which to compare. Stated most
succinctly, Rousseau’s conception of happiness is a simple life
drawn from the deeper well of our own self-sufficiency and
contentment with existence.
One may observe that no excellent sheep is an island, but
even still, a serious reading of Rousseau’s assessment of
amour-propre and his solution to the problem demands sober
reflection on our habit of comparison to others and what might
be done about it. To Rousseau, amour-propre is deeply
entrenched. Worse still for us, we are unable to retreat from
society in quite the same way Rousseau does in his Reveries.
Nevertheless, we can still ask the questions of ourselves that his
analysis raises—what do we do because we enjoy the praise it
earns us? What do we do for fear of not measuring up if we do
not? What do we refuse to do for fear of failure? How often do
we find ourselves quite literally looking at another person and
considering the ways in which we think he or she is better or
worse than us?
These are questions that, if asked seriously, should illuminate the places where we are most enslaved to the opinions of
others; as such, asking these questions can be a risk, for to
examine the parts of ourselves that are dependent on others is to
acknowledge vulnerabilities we may wish to remain unexposed.
Despite this risk, though, a willingness to search for substantive
53
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answers to the questions of why we burn the midnight oil, join
ten clubs, and cast every part of life in terms of success or
failure is, in my estimation, the first step towards freedom from
the opinion of others.
Deresiewicz and Rousseau both articulate the pervasive
problem of a life spent worrying about what others think of
you. For them, such a life is an exercise in exhaustion and
unhappiness. It is a treadmill of accomplishments, empty
accolades, stress, and, most importantly, constant comparison,
and it leaves those stuck running on it with no purpose other
than to keep from falling off. Rousseau offers a solution to this
problem, and it is one of radical contentment with the simple
fact of one’s own existence. One may find such an existence to
be deeply unsatisfying or impractical. However, by proposing
such a remedy, Rousseau moves the conversation forward, and
in doing so, he raises the question that any excellent sheep
should be keen to address: if a life spent on the treadmill of
success leads to unhappiness, how do we step off?
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